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“We can’t reject something just because it’s stupid.” 
– Esther M. Kepplinger, Deputy Commissioner of the U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office. 1 
 
“Microsoft Patents Ones, Zeroes.” 
– THE ONION, March 25, 1998.2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States patent system is facing a crisis of 
confidence. There is a widespread perception that changes in the 
standards of patentability, the increasing importance of the 
information economy and the sheer volume of applications before 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) 
have combined to overwhelm the patent system.3 
Bad patents and costly litigation lie at the heart of this crisis. 
Academics, business leaders and government officials have all 
expressed concern that too many patents are issued for 
“inventions” that are obvious, vague or already widely used.4 In 
 1. Responding to the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See David Streitfeld, Note: This Headline is Patented, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at 1. 
 2. Microsoft Patents Ones, Zeroes, THE ONION (Mar. 25, 1998) at 33-11, 
available at http://www.theonion.com/content/node/29130. The Onion is a 
satirical newspaper. 
 3. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 109TH CONG., PATENT QUALITY 
IMPROVEMENT (Comm. Print 2005), available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju20709.000/hju20709_1.htm. 
 4. See, e.g., Editorial, Patent Sanity is Pending, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, at 
M.4; see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE 
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), 
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addition to patents that should never have been issued, attempts 
by patent holders to extend their rights to devices and services 
that bear little or no relationship to their initial patent 
application are equally problematic. These overreaching claims 
have been made possible because the scope of issued patents is 
hopelessly unclear.5 
Technology heavyweights including Intel, Microsoft, and 
Oracle argue that although the patent system is the foundation 
for the United States’ global leadership position in technological 
development, there is a pressing need to restore the balance 
between the rights of patent holders and the broader social good 
of encouraging innovation. These companies fear that, rather 
than encouraging the “progress of science and the useful arts” as 
required by the United States Constitution,6 declining patent 
quality and overly broad patent rights are reducing incentives to 
invest in manufacturing, research and development.7 Even 
obvious beneficiaries of the patent system, such as IBM, which 
receives more U.S. Patents than any other company, strongly 
support calls for patent reform.8 
Calls for reform from the technology sector have begun to 
resonate in the media and in the Supreme Court; yet efforts in 
Congress to implement patent reform legislation have repeatedly 
failed.9 Editorials from several major papers decry that “there’s 
something rotten in the U.S. patent system;”10 “the U.S. patent 
system is profoundly flawed;”11 and that “the nation’s patent 
system is a mess.”12 The Supreme Court has recently heard cases 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC 
REPORT]. 
 5. See infra Part I. 
 6. The United States Constitution provides Congress with the power “To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 7. See Patti Waldmeir, Get it Now from Ebay, Hostage to the Patent Trolls, 
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2006, at 15. 
 8. IBM, PATENT REFORM: IMPROVE QUALITY, REDUCE LITIGATION, AND 
ENCOURAGE INNOVATION, 
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/governmentalprograms/ibmpatentreform.pdf; see also, 
Brendon Chase, IBM Calls for Patent Reform, ZDNET AUSTRALIA, Apr. 11, 2005, 
http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/0,39023165,39187609,00.htm. 
 9. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 
 10. The Problem with Patents, THE WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2006 at A18. 
 11. Editorial, Patent Sanity is Pending, supra note 4. 
 12. Editorial, U.S. Patent System Has Run Aground, THE BOSTON HERALD, 
July 24, 2005, at 26; see also Monopolies of the Mind, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 
2004, at 14. 
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on the scope of patent injunctions,13 the limits of patentable 
subject matter,14 the status of patent rights in antitrust 
proceedings,15 the application of the experimental use doctrine in 
clinical trials16 and future of the Federal Circuit’s “teaching-
suggestion-motivation” test in relation to obviousness.17 
In 2005, Congressional Representatives Lamar Smith and 
Howard Berman proposed a bi-partisan reform bill that would 
have dramatically changed the patent landscape.18  However, 
that bill was shelved at the end of 2005 due to time restrictions 
and the failure of the House Judiciary Committee to negotiate a 
consensus between technology interests, the pharmaceutical 
industry, and independent inventors.19 Undeterred, 
Representative Smith yet again proposed significant changes to 
the United States patent system, this time under the rubric of the 
Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, (“the House Bill”).20  On 
August 3, 2006, Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy 
introduced an alternative compromise bill intended to bridge the 
impasse between various stakeholders (“the Senate Reform 
Bill”).21 Regrettably, both these pieces of legislation were set 
aside in late 2006 because of looming mid-term elections in 
November of that year.
There is no shortage of ideas as to how to reform the United 
States patent system – there may in fact be too many such 
 13. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). 
 14. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 
(2006) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted). 
 15. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006). 
 16. Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
 17. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (granting writ of 
certiorari). The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in this case on Tuesday, 
November 28, 2006. 
 18. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced 
June 8, 2005, by Representative Lamar Smith, Chairman of the House 
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property). 
 19. See, e.g., Patent Reform 2005 -- It is Over, 
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2005/12/patent_reform_2.html (Dec. 8, 
2005). 
 20. The bill was introduced on April 5, 2006. See Representative Howard 
Berman, Statement on the Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006 (Apr. 5, 2006), 
available at http://www.house.gov/list/speech/ca28_berman/Patent_Quality.html. 
 21. See Press Release, Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Hatch Introduces Patent 
Reform Legislation (Aug. 7, 2006), available at 
http://hatch.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressReleas
e_id=1642; Patent Reform Act of 2006, S.3818, 109th Cong. (2006). 
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proposals.22  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)23 and the 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS)24 have both issued 
comprehensive reports on the subject in the last few years; days, 
if not weeks, of congressional hearings have been devoted to 
patent reform; and there is an extensive body of law review 
literature proposing reforms to the way patents are examined, 
changes to substantive patent law doctrines, and structural 
reform of patent litigation.25  However, as the failure of the 
Patent Reform Act of 2005 and the House and Senate Patent 
Reform Bills of 2006 demonstrate, there may, in fact, be too many 
reform proposals currently on the table. Missing from the current 
patent reform debate is a rational methodology by which 
Congress can prioritize its reform agenda.  This article fills that 
 22. An unrestricted search of the  LexisNexis U.S. Law Review Database for 
the term “patent” within five words of the term “reform” yields over 700 hits, 
restricting that search to the last 5 years yields over 400 hits. Significant 
literature in this area includes Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? 
Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 885 (2004); Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and 
Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why 
Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (2004); Jay P. 
Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 763 (2002); Jay P. Kesan and Andres A. Gallo, Why ‘Bad’ Patents Survive in 
the Market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of 
Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61 (2006); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents 
and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 
55 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1495 (2001); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before 
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999); Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: 
Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667 
(2004); Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907 (2004); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A 
Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 
(2003); John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative 
Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727 
(2002); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A 
Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305 (2001). 
 23. FTC REPORT, supra note 4 (providing an analysis of the interaction of 
competition and patent law offering ten recommendations for patent system 
reform). 
 24. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill, et al. eds. 2004), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf [hereinafter NAS 
REPORT]. (The National Academy of Sciences report on the U.S. patent system 
was released shortly after the FTC Report and contained seven key 
recommendations for reforming the patent system that closely parallel the FTC’s 
suggestions). 
 25. See infra Part I.B. 
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gap by proposing a test of differential impact for patent reform.26 
For a reform proposal to have a differential impact on bad patents 
it must discourage the acquisition and/or assertion of bad patents 
without affecting the value of good patents. 
The differential impact approach elucidated in this article 
has three distinct advantages over other proffered efforts to 
rewrite the patent system from the ground up. First, the 
differential impact approach provides a mechanism by which to 
evaluate competing claims for legislative resources. This is 
significant because without such an approach there is no way to 
decide how a reform in relation to patent examination should be 
compared to a reform to the structure of patent litigation.  
Second, the differential impact approach is an appropriate 
response to the empirical uncertainty surrounding optimal patent 
scope. Many of the current reform proposals proceed from the 
assumption that patents are either too easy to get, or too easy to 
enforce – an assumption which is, as yet, unproven. In contrast, 
as discussed in detail in Part II of this article, we do know with 
some certainty that bad patents are too easy to get and too easy to 
enforce.  Third, differential impact is consistent with the need to 
take the legitimate expectations of current stakeholders into 
account. 
If the patent system is to continue to fulfill its constitutional 
function of promoting rather than hindering innovation, we must 
tailor patent reform to address the problems related to bad 
patents without unduly prejudicing the interests of the holders of 
good patents. Consequently, rather than attempt to strengthen or 
weaken the exclusive rights of patent holders across the board, 
we believe that highest priority should be given to those reforms 
that have a differential impact: i.e. those reforms that are likely 
to raise the cost of obtaining or enforcing a bad patent more than 
they raise the cost of obtaining or enforcing a good patent. The 
failure of the legislative reform efforts thus far underscores the 
importance of prioritizing the most important elements of patent 
reform – those with differential impact. 
The structure of the article is as follows. Part I provides an 
introduction to the problems created by bad patents and 
introduces the differential impact test for evaluating patent 
reform proposals. Part II examines the origin of bad patents and 
applies two different economic models to explain their 
persistence. The first model focuses on a potential infringer’s 
 26. See infra Part I.B. 
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incentives to challenge a bad patent; the second model focuses on 
a patent holder’s incentive to assert a patent.  We explain bad 
patents as an emergent phenomenon: they are the product of the 
apparently low quality of patent examination27 and the complex, 
uncertain, expensive and time-consuming nature of patent 
litigation.28 
Part III then assesses the major patent reform proposals 
currently under consideration against the test of differential 
impact in light of the economic models developed in the previous 
section. From this analysis, we conclude that Congress’ highest 
priority for patent reform should be the adoption of a system of 
post-grant review of patent validity. Post-grant review will have a 
differential impact by significantly lowering the cost of 
challenging the bad patents.29  The differential impact test 
supports the adoption of post-grant review which will provide a 
low cost method of challenging patents which appear highly likely 
to be invalid or hyper-asserted. A well designed system of post-
grant review will not impose a significant burden on good patent 
holders because those few good patents that are occasionally 
subject to review are unlikely to be found invalid.  Furthermore, 
post-grant review will actually benefit good patents by reducing 
uncertainty and information asymmetries relating to patent 
quality. 
Part IV demonstrates that in addition to supporting the idea 
of post-grant review in general, the differential impact test may 
also be applied to build a better model for post-grant review. 
Looking at post-grant review through the lens of differential 
impact leads us to propose a system that is very different from 
those embodied in current legislative and other proposals. In 
short, we propose: (i) adopting a variable presumption of validity 
depending on the level of review that a patent has been subject to; 
(ii) implementing a multiple stage system of post-grant review 
with two distinct stages in order to balance the goal of greater 
scrutiny for bad patents with the need to minimize potential 
harassment of good patents; and (iii) bringing questions of claim 
construction into post-grant review such that both sides of the 
 27. See infra Part II.A. 
 28. See infra Part II.B.   
  
     29.  See infra Part II.C. See generally Stuart J.H. Graham and Dietmar 
Harhoff, Can Post Grant Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin Study 
of US and European Patents (Governance and the Efficiency of Economic 
Systems, Discussion Paper No. 38, 2006), available at http://www.gesy.uni-
mannheim.de/dipa/38.pdf. 
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bad patent phenomenon can be addressed. These proposals are all 
designed to ensure that post-grant review provides a low cost way 
to challenge bad patents, but does not undermine the value of 
good patents. 
PART I.  THE NEED FOR A PRIORITIZING TOOL 
A. THE PROBLEM WITH PATENTS 
Historically patents were intended to reward research and 
innovation; however, in its modern incarnation, the U.S. patent 
system creates numerous perverse effects that undermine that 
central mission. Some of the more trivial illustrations of the 
perversity of the modern patent system include patents such as 
the Tarzan Swing Method,30 the Beerbrella,31 a Method for 
Exercising Your Cat (with a laser pointer),32 the Hair Comb-Over 
Patent,33 and the Peanut Butter & Jelly Sandwich patent.34  
These patents are silly, but they are typically of little 
consequence except to prompt the question, “what else has the 
Patent Office been doing?”  The real damage to the effectiveness 
of the patent system is done by “bad patents” – patents which 
either should never have been granted, or are asserted well 
beyond their legitimate scope.35 
The danger of bad patents is that they undermine the 
incentive function of the patent system. A patent monopoly 
imposes costs on third parties who must either license the patent, 
        30. U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 Abstract (filed Nov. 17, 2000) (“A method of 
swing [ing] on a swing is disclosed, in which a user positioned on a standard 
swing suspended by two chains from a substantially horizontal tree branch 
induces side to side motion by pulling alternately on one chain and then the 
other.”). 
 31. U.S. Patent No. 6,637,447 Abstract (filed Oct. 19, 2001) (“[a] small 
umbrella . . . which may be removably attached to a beverage container in order 
to shade the beverage container from the direct rays of the sun.”). 
 32. U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 Abstract (filed Nov. 2, 1993) (“A method for 
inducing cats to exercise consists of directing a beam of invisible light produced 
by a hand-held laser apparatus onto the floor . . . then moving the laser so as to 
cause the bright pattern of light to move in an irregular way fascinating to 
cats.”). 
 33. U.S. Patent No. 6,257,248 (filed Dec. 10, 1999) (patent for cutting or 
styling hair using scissors or combs in both hands). 
 34. U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (filed Dec. 8, 1997) (“a sealed crustless 
sandwich”).  For many other examples see freepatentsonline, 
http://www.freepatentsonline.com/crazy.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 35. The term “bad patents” is defined more exactly in Part I.B, infra. 
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challenge the patent in court, or expend resources to avoid 
infringement by designing around the patent. Where patents are 
properly granted and properly asserted, the monopoly cost of the 
patent holder’s rights and her incentive to invest in innovation 
are generally two sides of the same coin. However, the system 
creates perverse incentives if all the advantages of a patent 
monopoly are in fact available to those who merely industriously 
create or collect bad patents, as opposed to those who invest 
(directly or indirectly) in innovation.36 If a baseball player could 
get a home run from hitting a foul ball, there would not be much 
incentive to try to hit the ball into the field. 
Bad patents should not be confused with so-called patent 
trolls.37 Popular and academic discussion of the assertion of 
patent rights by non-practicing entities is commonly linked to 
questions of patent quality, but the issues of “bad patents” and 
“patent trolls” are in fact severable. We are not aware of any 
evidence that patent trolls are more likely to have or assert bad 
patents than practicing entities. The key argument against 
patent trolls is not that their assertions are necessarily invalid, 
but rather that they are in a position to negotiate licensing fees 
that are grossly out of alignment with their contribution to the 
alleged infringer’s product or service.38 The reforms addressed in 
this article do not begin to address that problem, except in so far 
as a particular troll is relying on a bad patent.39 
The meritless assertion of patent rights diverts scarce 
research and development funding  from engineering to 
 36. As the NAS notes in its 2004 report, “patents on trivial innovations may 
confer market power or allow firms to use legal resources aggressively as a 
competitive weapon without consumer benefit.” See NAS REPORT, supra note 24, 
at 95. 
 37. The term “patent troll” was initially coined a lawyer at Intel Corporation 
to describe entities “that try to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not 
practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced.” 
Alan Murray, War on ‘Patent Trolls' May Be Wrong Battle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 
2006, at A2. The term is now broadly understood as a derogatory shorthand for 
any non-practicing entity that asserts patent rights. See Wikipedia, Patent Troll, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patent_troll#Definition_and_etymology (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2007). 
 38. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty 
Stacking (2006), (working paper on file with authors.). 
 39. In spite of its widespread use, the exact definition of the term patent troll 
is disputed. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, lines 4-6,  eBay, 126 S. 
Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) (“Well, is the troll the scary thing under the bridge, or is it 
a fishing technique?”).  Note that § 5 of the Senate Bill attempts to codify an 
“apportionment” rule for the calculation of damages for patent infringement that 
would reduce the leverage of so-called patent trolls.  S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 
(2006). 
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lawyering; it also diverts patent licensing revenue from the 
holders of good patents.  A proliferation of unmeritorious 
allegations of patent infringement and subsequent litigation is 
clearly bad for defendants, but it is also bad for those companies 
that have invested in innovation and rely on the patent system to 
protect that investment. The aggressive tactics of the bad patent 
holders increases the transaction costs for good patent holders 
when they wish to signal that their claims of infringement must 
be taken seriously. 
The availability of robust patent protection acts as a 
significant stimulus to investment in research, development, and 
innovation. However, when aggressive patent holders can extract 
substantial license fees simply through leveraging the 
overwhelming costs and delays involved in challenging a patent, 
whether good or bad, the incentives to get a good patent are 
reduced and the overall burden of the patent system on society is 
increased. 
Consider the hypothetical example of Carla, a small Internet 
retailer.  Just before the critical holiday retail season, Carla 
receives a letter from a patent licensing firm. The letter states 
that the firm is willing to negotiate a license, based on the firm’s 
asserted patent rights, concerning a particular aspect of Internet-
based shopping cart checkout technology that Carla uses on her 
website.  The firm offers the license for an annual fee of $50,000. 
Carla is suspicious of the validity of the patent because the 
claimed invention seems too broad and abstract. She is also 
suspicious because the idea of this electronic shopping cart 
technology has been in common use for so long that she does not 
equate it with patented technology.  Armed with these suspicions, 
Carla asks Jane, a friendly patent lawyer, for some help.  After 
reviewing the letter and the patent, Jane offers several pieces of 
information and advice: (1) the patent should probably never have 
been issued for a number of reasons, most obviously because it 
was “anticipated” by an earlier invention that the Patent Office 
examiner was not aware of;40 (2) for $30,000, Carla can get an 
opinion letter that says the patent is invalid and that even if it 
was valid, she does not infringe it;41 (3) without such a letter, 
 40. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (novelty provisions). 
 41. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASSOC., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC 
SURVEY 102 (2005) [hereinafter, AIPLA ECON. SURVEY]. Although the average 
cost of a patent opinion from a mid-sized firm is $23,997, prices as high as 
$40,000 are not uncommon in areas such as New York City. Id. 
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Carla may be liable for treble damages and attorney’s fees for the 
entire period since she received the patent holder’s letter if she is 
later found to infringe the patent;42 (4) Carla probably cannot go 
to court to have the patent declared invalid because she lacks 
standing for declaratory judgment;43 (5) even if Carla could 
persuade a court to hear her case, it would probably cost her 
around $650,000 to invalidate the patent (give or take a few 
hundred thousand dollars);44 (6) given that the patent is likely 
flawed, Carla could submit it to the Patent Office for an 
administrative process known as reexamination based on the 
existence of prior art – but if she does, she either won’t be able to 
participate meaningfully in that reexamination process,45 or 
worse still, if she loses her reexamination in the Patent Office, 
she won’t be able to make the same arguments again in any later 
court proceeding.46 In the end, Jane cheerfully suggests that 
Carla should consider paying the $50,000, regardless of the likely 
invalidity of the patent. 
This is the real perversity of the current patent system: 
rational actors will pay licensing fees for patents they strongly 
suspect are either invalid, or simply do not apply to them, 
because each of the alternatives is worse. 
 42. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 
383 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The remedy for willful infringement is 
based on 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (“the court may increase the damages up to three 
times the amount found or assessed”) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000) (“the court in 
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party”). 
 43. Vermeer Mfg. Co. v. Deere & Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d 645 (D. Del. 2005) 
(patent holder did not create a reasonable apprehension of suit through a letter 
stating that the patent holder would enforce its patent rights and that the 
opposing party appeared to infringe on the patent).  However, the recent 
Supreme Court decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc may signal the 
immergence of a more flexible doctrine relating to requirements in patent cases.  
127 S. Ct. 764 (2007) (holding that the requirements of a case or controversy are 
met where payment of a claim is demanded as of right and where payment is 
made, but where the involuntary or coercive nature of the exaction preserves the 
right to recover the sums paid or to challenge the legality of the claim.) 
 44. AIPLA ECON. SURVEY, supra note 41, at 108. 
 45. The Patent Act provides for both ex parte reexaminations under 35 
U.S.C. § 302 (2000) and inter partes reexamination under 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2000). 
The Act also provides for Commissioner ordered reexaminations under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 303(a) (2000).  See generally UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/reexam_report.htm (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 46. The Patent Act provides that any issue raised by a challenger during 
reexamination cannot be revisited in a later trial involving that challenger. See 
35 U.S.C. § 317 (2000).  See also Farrell & Merges, supra note 22, at 967. 
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B.  A DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT ON BAD PATENTS 
Congress faces a dizzying array of options when it comes to 
overhauling the patent system, but what is lacking from the 
patent reform debate so far is a framework for prioritizing these 
reforms. This article addresses that need by proposing that 
Congress should apply the differential impact test to determine 
which reforms are most pressing. We argue that the highest 
priority for patent reform should be reserved for those measures 
that will have a differential impact on bad patents. This raises 
two questions: first, what is it about a patent that makes it bad; 
and second, what is differential impact? 
1. Defining Bad Patents 
For all the discussion of falling patent quality and 
opportunistic litigation, there appears to be no agreed-upon 
definition of what makes a patent “bad.” The term is often used 
loosely to denote patents that should not have been issued.47 
Patents can fail to meet the standards of patentability despite 
being issued by the Patent Office.48 Currently, roughly half of all 
litigated patent claims are found invalid by the courts for reasons 
such as anticipation or obviousness.49 Are all of these patents 
“bad”? We doubt it. Defining bad patents solely with reference to 
standards of patentability is problematic.  For example, it is not 
uncommon for a patent to be found to be invalid on the basis of 
prior art that the applicant could not reasonably be expected to 
have known about.50 Similarly, the uncertain nature of claim 
 47. See, e.g., Edward Hsieh, Note, Mandatory Joinder: An Indirect Method 
for Improving Patent Quality, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (2004) (defining bad patents 
as “patents that do not meet the statutory requirements of novelty and 
nonobviousness.”); see also Katharine M. Zandy, Too Much, Too Little, or Just 
Right? A Goldilocks Approach to Patent Reexamination Reform, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 865, 905 (defining bad patents as “patents that are likely to be 
invalidated if subjected to litigation or an administrative challenge.) Jay Kesan 
offers a more helpful definition; he uses the term as follows: “a patent is “bad” if 
it should not have been granted by the Patent Office after a reasonable search 
and review of the relevant prior art.” See Kesan , supra note 22. 
 48. Primarily novelty, 35 U.S.C. § 102, non-obviousness, 35 U.S.C. § 103, and 
written description, enablement and best mode, 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
 49. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of 
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-206 (1998) (reporting that, in a sample 
of 300 cases, only 54% of final validity decisions found the patent valid. This 
analysis is at the patent level, not the claim level but the authors of this study 
treat cases with split rulings on claim validity as two separate patents). 
 50. See, e.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898-899 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that 
a single copy of a doctoral thesis, properly cataloged in the collection of a German 
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construction makes predicting the ultimate validity of any patent 
claim a speculative art at best.51 For these reasons we believe 
that it would be over-inclusive to define bad patents as those 
patents that should not have been issued given the wisdom of 
hindsight.  Clearly, part of the definition of bad patents must 
encompass patents that a reasonably diligent applicant would 
have known failed to meet the statutory requirements of 
patentability. But such patents are merely the beginning of the 
bad patent phenomenon. 
As an alternative to defining bad patents simply as invalid 
patents, we propose a functionalist definition of bad patents that 
focuses more clearly on those patents which are likely to distort 
the allocation of resources. The British Telecom (“BT”) hyperlink 
patent provides a good example of a different kind of bad patent. 
In 2002, telecommunications giant BT attempted to assert patent 
rights over the creation of hyperlinks on the Internet.  One of the 
many striking things about BT’s claims was that this patent was 
initially filed in 197652, well before the technology they effectively 
claimed to own was invented.53  BT’s U.S. Patent No. 4,873,662, 
eventually issued in 1989, describes a system where multiple 
users can access data on a central computer by using remote 
terminals.  BT claimed that this patent read on the technology 
used in Internet hyperlinks. BT contacted various Internet 
Service Providers (“ISP”) and demanded license fees, claiming 
that the ISP’s actions facilitated the infringement of the patent by 
providing ISP subscribers with access to the Internet.  When 
eventually challenged in federal court, BT’s infringement claims 
were dismissed on summary judgment, with the judge holding 
that no reasonable jury could have found that the scope of the 
patent’s claims covered Internet hyperlinks.54  While the bad 
University Library qualified as anticipating prior art). 
 51. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(Rader, J., dissenting) (noting that almost 40% of all district court claim 
constructions appealed to the Federal Circuit since Markman I were reversed); 
see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Mayer, J., 
dissenting) (Describing the process of claim construction as mayhem); Lava 
Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt., LLC, 445 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 52. That is, the U.S. patent claimed priority from a July 20, 1976 United 
Kingdom filing. 
 53. See Kurt Kleiner, BT in Court to Enforce Hyperlink Patent, NEW 
SCIENTIST, February 11, 2002, available at 
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn1905; U.S. Patent No. 4,873,662 
(filed Aug. 15, 1980). 
 54. British Telecomms. PLC v. Prodigy Commc’ns Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 
399, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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patent assertions by BT were eventually removed from the 
marketplace, they were still able to cause significant financial 
harm before they were formally rejected. 
As the litigation over the BT Hyperlink patent illustrates, 
even a technically valid patent can become a bad patent if it is 
asserted beyond its legitimate scope.  The BT Hyperlink patent 
may well have been properly granted; however, it was the broad 
assertion of rights by BT that made the hyperlink patent a bad 
patent.55 
In sum, the term bad patent should be used to identify not 
only invalid patents, but also patents that are asserted (by 
implication or otherwise) to cover a product or activity that no 
reasonable fact finder in possession of all the relevant facts could 
find that they covered.  The reason for adopting this functionalist 
definition of bad patents is that we are less concerned about 
whether a patent turns out to be technically valid, and more 
concerned about whether it is used as the basis for an assertion of 
rights that is objectively lacking in merit. A patent that should 
not have been issued and a patent that was validly issued but is 
now the subject of hyper-assertion both result in the patent 
holder claiming legal rights she does not in fact possess. These 
are the patents that undermine the incentive rationale of the 
patent system. 
2. Differential Impact 
In his seminal 1958 review of the economic literature relating 
to the patent system, economist Fritz Machlup concluded that: 
 
No economist, on the basis of present knowledge, could possibly state 
with certainty that the patent system, as it now operates, confers a net 
benefit or a net loss upon society. . . . If we did not have a patent system, 
it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its 
economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we 
have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on 
the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.56 
 
Machlup was not suggesting that there is no evidence as to 
whether the patent system has costs or benefits, but rather that 
 55. On this theory, the patent did not become “bad” until BT argued for a 
claim construction that was unsupported by the actual invention. 
 56. FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, 
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, Study No 15, 85th Cong, 2d Sess. at 79 (1958). 
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there is substantial conflicting evidence as to the magnitudes of 
those costs and benefits. Scholars generally agree that we are 
empirically uncertain about far too many things to know whether 
expanding or contracting scope or availability of patent rights will 
be beneficial.57 The interesting question is what we should do in 
the face of this uncertainty. Machlup himself saw no reason why 
uncertainty should lead to policy paralysis. He argued that 
regardless of the global uncertainty in relation to the patent 
system, “the student of the economics . . . need not disqualify 
himself as a judge of proposed changes in the existing system. . . . 
a team of well-trained economic researchers and analysts should 
be able to obtain enough information to reach competent 
conclusions on questions of patent reform.”58 
One of the most pressing problems in the patent system 
today is not that patents in general are too easy to obtain or too 
easy to enforce; rather it is that bad patents are too easy to obtain 
and enforce. The solution to this problem is not to simply make 
all patents less valuable.  Rather, the solution is to try and reform 
the system so that bad patents are more easily weeded out 
without undue prejudice to good patents. Ideally, any change to 
the current patent system must benefit companies that have 
invested in innovation and use valid patents to protect that 
investment; it certainly should not harm them.  In order to 
achieve this, we argue that the reform proposals garnering 
congressional attention should be uniformly assessed against a 
test of differential impact.  The strong form of this test is that a 
reform must reduce the incentives for obtaining or asserting bad 
patents without reducing those same incentives for good patents. 
The weak form of the differential impact test simply requires that 
a reform reduce the incentives for obtaining or asserting bad 
patents more than it reduces those same incentives for good 
patents. 
The differential impact test is necessary because of the 
empirical uncertainty as to the optimum scope of patent rights 
and because of the need for a targeted legislative proposal that 
might have a better chance of being passed by Congress. There 
are many reform proposals that might make sense if we were 
rebuilding the patent system from the ground up, but, if we are 
pursuing less radical change, we must keep in mind the 
expectations of those individuals and corporations who have 
 57. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of 
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990). 
 58. MACHLUP, supra note 56. 
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The phenomenon of bad patents stems from both the 
apparent low quality of patent examination and the complex, 
uncertain, expensive and time-consuming nature of patent 
litigation.  It is important to understand the relationship between 
these two factors. If only an insignificant number of patents were 
improperly issued, it would not matter very much that patent 
litigation was so expensive. In this scenario, only good patents 
would be issued and the burden of expensive patent litigation 
would fall largely on infringers with a real case to answer. 
Similarly, if challenging invalid patents was simple, quick, and 
cheap, it would not matter if there were vast numbers of 
improperly issued patents. In this alternative scenario, alleged 
infringers would be able to quickly ascertain the likely merits of 
the patent holder’s claim by attempting to invalidate the patent. 
Knowing that alleged infringers will routinely test the quality of 
patents, patent holders would have a strong incentive to only 
already invested in the current system. 
The objective of this article is to explain the need for 
differential impact analysis of patent reform and to evaluate the 
current reform proposals against that test. However, in order to 
make that possible, it is first necessary to understand why the 
Patent Office issues invalid patents and how bad patents 
continue to survive in the market place once they have been 
issued. Accordingly, the next Part explores the origin and 
survival of bad patents. 
PART II. THE ORIGIN AND SURVIVAL OF BAD PATENTS 
Congressional action on patent reform should be targeted 
toward implementing those reforms that are most likely to have a 
differential impact on bad patents, that is, those reforms that will 
reduce the value of bad patents without undermining the value of 
good patents. In order to examine which reforms are most likely 
to have a differential impact on bad patents it is first necessary to 
understand why, in spite of its best efforts, the Patent Office 
continues to issue invalid and ill-defined patents and how those 
patents are used in the marketplace. In this section we use two 
different economic models to explain why some patent holders see 
value in asserting patent rights that no reasonable judge or jury 
would ultimately vindicate. These models also suggest which 
reforms are most likely to reduce this kind of activity without 
damaging the legitimate interests of good patent holders. 
A. PATENT EXAMINATION 
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make defensible claims of infringement. In contrast with the 
foregoing scenarios, the problems with the current patent system 
arise in part because too many potentially bad patents issue, and 
in part because it is too costly for alleged infringers to challenge 
or test their validity.59 Accordingly, the problem of bad patents 
cannot be understood in one-dimensional terms; it emerges from 
the interaction of the features of both patent examination and 
patent litigation. 
Bad patents emerge from the Patent Office due to a 
combination of limited resources and distorted incentives. Almost 
any patent lawyer will agree that the U.S. patent system is 
currently overburdened: there are too many patent applications 
and not enough examiners to ensure that the merits of each and 
every patent are properly assessed.  In the 2005 fiscal year, the 
Patent Office received over 380,000 new patent applications and 
issued more than 152,000 patents.60 Each one of those issued 
patents spent an average of two to three years in prosecution.61  
Yet during that time, the average patent was probably only 
examined for as little as 18 hours and at most 41.5 hours.62 
The Patent Office currently has 4,200 patent examiners, but 
plans to hire 1,000 patent examiners a year for the next several 
years to increase its current staff. 63 Even so, given the growth in 
the volume of applications over the last two decades and the 
likely turnover of examiners at the Patent Office,64 the office will 
 59. Patents are potentially rather than categorically “bad” at the time they 
are issued because how they will actually be used is not predetermined. 
 60. These figures relate to utility, plant, and reissue patent applications; 
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, USPTO PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 18 (2005), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2005. 
 61. Id. at 6 (“pendency—the amount of time a patent application is waiting 
before a patent is issued—now averages more than two years. In more complex 
art areas, such as data-processing technologies, average pendency stands at more 
than three years.”); see also Lemley, supra note 22, at 1500. 
 62. Id. Lemley cites various estimates of the amount of time spent examining 
the average patent ranging from eighteen to eight hours. These estimates may be 
out of date. According to one examiner, the average initial decision for a digital 
camera patent takes about twenty-four hours, to actually finalize the claims and 
approve the patent issues presumably takes several additional hours.  See Kevin 
Maney, Patent Applications So Abundant That Examiners Can't Catch Up, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 21, 2005, at B3.  We can calculate the upper bound of examination 
time by dividing the number of hours worked by examiners by the number of 
patents issued every year. Assuming 4200 examiners each allocate 1500 hours a 
year to examination yields 6.3 million hours of examination. Dividing this by the 
152,000 patents issued in 2005 yields 41.5 hours per patent. 
 63. Kevin Maney, supra note 62. 
 64. Patent examiners, on average, spend only three to five years with the 
Patent Office before leaving.   This means that within a four year period, the 
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likely struggle to keep pace with increasing demands for 
examination if no other changes are made to the system. The 
mismatch between patent applications and examination resources 
has resulted in considerable delays in the time it takes the Patent 
Office to issue a patent.65 The Patent Office currently faces a 
backlog as high as 885,000 applications, many of which have not 
even been assigned to an examiner.66 According to its 2005 
annual report, the Patent Office estimates the average time it 
takes to examine and issue a patent to be about twenty-nine 
months, although the figure is much higher in certain fields such 
as software and business method patents.67 Furthermore, the 
Patent Office reports that unless reforms are implemented or the 
agency’s budget is expanded, the current backlog will increase to 
up to five years.68 
As the Patent Office struggles with the availability of 
examination resources, it must also face the recent extension of 
patentable subject matter into new fields. In the past twenty-five 
years, legal and technological changes have combined to radically 
extend the application of the patent system to new areas, 
including software, business methods, and genomics.69 
These new frontiers of patentability have increased the strain 
on the Patent Office in two ways. First, increasingly permissive 
equivalent of the entire current staff of examiners at the Patent Office will have 
left.  This points to both a continuing problem of staffing levels and also a 
problem with retention of experienced examiners.  See Randy Barrett, Report: 
Patent Office Should Become Federal Corporation, NAT’L J. TECH. DAILY, Aug. 24 
2005, available at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0805/082405td1.htm. 
 65. The Patent Office allegedly told an applicant for a business method 
patent that its recently filed application might take as long as fourteen years to 
be examined. See PTO: First Office Action Expected Fall 2019, 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/06/pto_first_offic.html (2006). 
 66. Tricia Bishop, 43.5-Month Patent Process Not Moving Fast Enough, THE 
BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 30, 2006, at 4C. (The increase has led to the fear that some 
patents, despite the time frame, are being granted without proper review). Victor 
Godinez, Patent System Under Scrutiny BlackBerry Case Highlights Complaints, 
Backlog of Applications, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, March 26, 2006. (The 
agency has a backlog of nearly 600,000 patent applications, and the stack is 
growing). 
 67. Id. (It takes an average of more than three years – 43.5 months, to be 
exact – for the government to process a software patent application.). 
 68. See John W. Schoen, U.S. Patent Office Swamped By Backlog, Without 
More Funding, Wait Time Could Top 5 Years, MSNBC, Apr. 27, 2004, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4788834/ (quoting Jon W. Dudas). 
 69. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (filed Mar. 11, 1991) (first business 
method patent, ruled patentable subject matter in State Street Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
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rules on patentable subject matter have led to a deluge of patent 
applications in those fields.70 Second, new subject matter patents 
are more difficult for the Patent Office to examine because they 
cannot simply turn to previously published patents to begin the 
search for prior art. Furthermore, patent examiners are at a 
comparative disadvantage in reviewing new technology because 
they cannot readily access outside expertise without violating the 
confidentiality of the patent applicant.71 Even more remarkably, 
patent examiners in many art areas are prohibited from 
searching on Google and other Internet search engines to search 
for prior art references.72 In response to vigorous criticism of its 
treatment of new subject matter, the Patent Office instituted new 
policies in 2000 and 2001 designed to improve patent quality in 
some areas.73  However, the impact of the Patent Office’s new 
policies has thus far been difficult to judge. 
In addition, the Patent Office has been affected by 
“technology creep.”74 Old classifications such as electrical, 
chemical, and mechanical inventions have been displaced by far 
more complex fields like semiconductors, biotechnology, and 
nanotechnology, all of which require far more specialized 
expertise. 
Even taking into account its limited resources, the Patent 
Office has been criticized for simply being too willing to grant 
patents. Arguably, the Patent Office’s internal culture and 
organization predispose examiners to granting patents too easily. 
Factors that might contribute to a culture of permissive patent 
issuance include: (1) patent examiners face no penalties for 
issuing ultimately bad patents;75 (2) patent examiners are only 
 70. Jennifer A. Albert & Emerson V. Briggs, III, Strategies of Tech Business 
Include Utility Patents, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 29, 2001, at B23 (reporting that “the 
PTO has been inundated with patent applications during the past two years and 
can barely keep up. It is generally understood that this increase in filings results 
from an influx of computer, software, and Internet-based applications in the 
wake of the Federal Circuit's holding in State Street.”). 
 71. See Beth Novak, Peer to Patent: Collective Intelligence and Intellectual 
Property Reform, (working paper on file with the authors 2006). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See NAS REPORT, supra note 24, at 55–56. 
 74. See Schoen, supra note 68. 
 75. John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative 
Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 733 
(2001) (“Courts do not fine the USPTO upon invalidating a patent; the examiners 
who allowed the case are not disciplined for their oversight; nor must the USPTO 
award damages to affected members of the public to compensate for an 
improvidently granted patent. The costs of failing to acquire information are 
simply shifted to other actors - in particular, the federal courts, the patentee's 
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rewarded for initial response to, and final determinations of, 
patent applications;76 and (3) continuation, continuation-in-part, 
and divisional applications can be used to wear down an 
examiner until at least some claims issue.77 
The imperfect nature of patent examination is widely 
acknowledged. Even the Patent Office acknowledges that its error 
rate is around 4%,78 although many scholars believe that number 
to be much, much higher.79   
The FTC reports that the Patent Office’s approval rate might 
be as high as 98%.80  This is compared with a 67% approval rate 
in Europe and 64% in Japan.81  The Patent Office argues that the 
true figure is more like a 75% approval rate or even a 60% rate.82  
However, other studies that account for the effect of 
continuations, continuations-in-part, and divisional applications 
estimate the Patent Office’s approval rate to be much higher.83  
Whatever the reasons for the Patent Office’s high rate of 
allowance might be, the fact that persistent applicants are almost 
always successful does not indicate a high threshold of quality 
competitors, and, ultimately, consumers.”) 
 76. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 463 (2004). 
 77. Id. at 456-57. 
 78. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002 18 (2005), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2002/1-58.pdf (showing an official 
“error rate,” based on internal quality assurance measures, of 4.2%. An error is 
defined as at least one claim within the randomly selected allowed application 
under quality review that would be held invalid in a court of law, if the 
application were to issue as a patent without the required correction. Some 
examples of errors include the issuance of a claim having anticipatory prior art 
under 35 U.S.C. § 102, or relevant prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 103 that would 
render the allowed claim obvious. Other errors include lack of compliance of the 
claim to the other statutory requirements (e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101, 35 U.S.C. § 112) 
and judicially created doctrines. The error rate is the ratio of patents issued with 
errors to the total number of patents issued). 
 79. Allison & Lemley, supra note 49, at 205-206 (only 54% of the patents 
were found valid in a population of 300 final validity decisions).  While this is 
may be in line with standard assumptions about the selection of disputes for 
litigation, the difference with patents is that they have previously been subject to 
a review process before entering the pool for selection. 
 80. See FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 217. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (75% approval rate); USPTO Director Jon Dudas,  Address at 2005 
AIPLA Meeting (Oct. 28, 2005). 
 83. C. Quillen and O. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and 
Performance of the U.S. Patent Office, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 5 (2001) (finding that 
the Grant Rate for the PTO in fiscal years 1993-1998, corrected for continuing 
applications, ranges from 80% to 97%). 
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control. 
The important policy question that flows from the imperfect 
nature of patent examination is whether it is worth spending 
money to make patent examination any better.  Patent lawyers 
and a number of academics have called for better funding for the 
Patent Office to improve patent examination.84 In contrast, 
somewhat like Dr. Strangelove,85 a few commentators have 
suggested giving up worrying about the issuance of invalid and 
uncertain patents and learning to love a system of quick-and-
dirty examination at the Patent Office – the theory being that 
poor quality patents will either be ignored by the market or dealt 
with through litigation.86 As Mark Lemley explains: 
[S]ociety ought to resign itself to the fact that bad patents will issue, and 
attempt to deal with the problem ex post, if the patent is asserted in 
litigation. This result is admittedly counterintuitive. It depends crucially 
on the fact that very few patents are ever the subject of litigation, or 
even licensing. Because of this, money spent improving the [Patent 
Office] examination procedures will largely be wasted on examining the 
ninety-five percent of patents that will either never be used, or will be 
used in circumstances that don’t crucially rely on the determination of 
validity.87 
Although the “rational ignorance” theory of patent 
examination is attractive, its advantages may be overstated. 
There are a number of reasons to suspect that bad patents are not 
effectively dealt with by market and judicial forces, as explained 
in more detail in the next section. 
B. THE PERSISTENCE OF BAD PATENTS 
There would be no need to worry about improving patent 
 84. Legislation has even been proposed to this end. See United States Patent 
and Trademark Fee Modernization Act of 2005, H.R.2791, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 85. DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE 
THE BOMB (Hawk Films Ltd. 1964). 
 86. Lemley, supra note 22, at 1497; see also Allison, supra note 76; Kieff, 
supra note 22 (arguing that patent applications should be registered, not 
examined). 
 87. Lemley, supra note 22, at 1510-11; see also, Farrell & Merges, supra note 
22, at 946 (“It would be a disgrace for a system to enforce a lot of improper 
patents. This need not mean that it is bad if the USPTO issues a lot of invalid 
patents. Rather, the entire system of application, examination, issuance, 
negotiation, licensing, challenge, and enforcement should be evaluated as a 
whole.”).   Lemley clearly recognizes that some examination related reforms are 
worth pursuing, id. at 1523-25, but his main contention is that the primary 
reform goal should be “to strengthen the validity inquiry made by the trial 
courts.” Id. at 1532. Critical responses to Lemley’s “rational ignorance” theory 
include Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of 
Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219 (2004). 
SAG M & ROHDE K. Patent Reform and Differential Impact. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2006;8(1):1-
93.  
22 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 8:1 
 
                                                          
 
examination if potential infringers were able to instantly 
recognize bad patents when they saw them and if patent holders 
viewed attempting to extract revenue based on such patents as a 
futile exercise. However, in reality invalid and hyper-asserted 
patents are capable of generating significant revenues and thus 
have a distorting effect on the allocation of resources in the 
economy. Indeed, as this section explains, the delay, uncertainty, 
and expense of patent litigation mean that alleged infringers 
have weak incentives to challenge bad patents and also that 
patent holders have strong incentives to over-claim their rights. 
Understanding these incentives is central to determining which 
proposed reforms are likely to have a differential impact on bad 
patents. 
1. Weak Incentives to Challenge 
Faced with the threat of litigation from the holder of a 
questionable patent, an alleged infringer must choose whether to 
pay the license fees the patent holder demands, challenge the 
validity or application of the patent, or simply exit the market.88 
One of the central problems with the current patent system is 
that there are many circumstances in which these choices will be 
dictated by the cost of litigation, not the validity of the patent 
holder’s claims.  In fact, the models discussed in this section 
demonstrate that as the cost of litigation increases, the validity of 
the asserted patent becomes less and less relevant to the alleged 
infringer’s decision to challenge. 
Both Farrell and Merges and Kesan and Gallo have 
developed formal models to determine whether litigation will 
adequately deal with the problem of bad patents.89  Their models 
are developed from the point of view of a potential defendant who 
is faced with the choice of licensing, ignoring, or challenging a 
 88. Exiting the market may mean that the alleged infringer abandons a line 
of business altogether or designs around the patent (thus exiting the patent 
market, but not the product market). 
 89. See, e.g., Kesan & Gallo, supra note 22, at 85;  Farrell & Merges, supra 
note 22, at 943 (arguing that litigation is an poor substitute for adequate patent 
examination and calling for greater funding for the Patent Office to improve 
patent review at the application stage); see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 
Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 76 (2005) (exploring the suboptimal 
incentives of private parties to challenge patents in courts and considering 
potential reforms); Miller, supra note 22, at 667 (proposing a regime of litigation-
stage bounties to encourage defendants to challenge patent validity); Edward 
Hsieh, Note, Mandatory Joinder: An Indirect Method for Improving Patent 
Quality, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (2004) (proposing a mandatory joinder solution). 
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patent holder’s assertion that some aspect of her business 
infringes on the patent holder’s rights.  We present here our own 
version of the challenger focused model which illustrates why 
alleged infringers will pay license fees rather than challenge bad 
patents in a significant number of cases. 
2. Challenger Focused Model 
The challenger focused model (“CF-model”) described in this 
section looks at the world from the perspective of a potential 
infringer who has received some indication that a patent holder 
believes she is infringing and has demanded a royalty payment 
accordingly. The alleged infringer must decide whether to take a 
license, challenge the patent, or exit the field. 
Variable Definitions: 
π = Profit to the potential infringer over 
the lifetime of the product (excluding 
any costs relating to the patent) 
CL = Cost of license payments. 
CP = Additional penalty cost of license 
payments after challenging the patent 
and losing. 
L = Cost of legal challenge. 
I = Cost of gathering information related 
to patent validity. 
P = Cost of any damages as a result of 
losing a challenge to the patent. 
Α = Probability that the alleged infringer 
would be able to successfully 
challenge the patent. 
 
Utility Functions: 
UWin = π – L – I 
ULose = π – L – I – CL – CP – P 
ULicense = π – CL – I 
UExit = 0 
UChallenge = α (UWin) + (1– α) (ULose) 
 
When faced with the scenario above, the alleged infringer of a 
potentially bad patent will decide whether to challenge the 
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patent, take a license, or exit the field based on which is least 
costly or most profitable. Generally, an alleged infringer will 
challenge the patent if her utility from doing so exceeds her 
utility from simply accepting the license demands of the patent 
holder, i.e., UChallenge > ULicense. However, if either challenging the 
patent or accepting the license would drive the alleged infringer 
out of business, that is, UChallenge< 0 and ULicense< 0, then the 
alleged infringer will simply exit the field. There are a number of 
different ways in which patent holders can obtain value from an 
individual patent or from a portfolio of patents: (1) they can use 
patents to exclude competitors from certain markets and thus 
charge higher prices (the exclusive strategy), (2) they can use the 
threat of exclusion to extract license fees (the extractive strategy), 
(3) they can use the threat of retaliatory litigation to avoid paying 
license fees for activity that infringes on the patent rights of 
another party (the defensive strategy), or (4) they can pursue a 
combination of these strategies. These diverse applications can be 
accounted for in the model by simply treating all patent holders 
as being extractive, but acknowledging that exclusive and 
defensive patent holders charge different kinds of prices. In effect, 
exclusive patent holders charge royalties that no potential 
infringer could afford to pay. Similarly, defensive patent holders 
charge royalties denominated in the royalties they do not pay for 
other people’s patents. On the other hand, extractive patent 
holders would prefer to get some direct revenue from their 
licensing targets and so will price their royalties such that at 
least some potential infringers can afford to pay them. 
The CF-model holds that an alleged infringer will challenge 
the patent holder by contesting either the validity or the 
applicability of the patent where her utility from doing so exceeds 
her utility of simply accepting the license demands of the patent 
holder. 
Challenge if: 
UChallenge > ULicense 
 
This inequality can be expanded as follows: 
 
α (UWin) + (1– α) (ULose) > π – CL – I 
α (π – L – I) + (1– α) (π – L – I – CL – CP – P) > π – CL – I 
 
Expanding and restating in terms of L yields: 
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L < αCL + (1-α) (CP + P)                                 (Equation 1) 
 
In words, the model shows that an alleged infringer will 
challenge the patent holder if the cost of litigation (L) is less than 
the probability of winning (α) times the cost of the license plus the 
probability of losing (1-α) multiplied by the penalties associated 
with an unsuccessful challenge to the patent, such as increased 
royalty rates and enhanced damages for willful infringement (CP 
+ P). 
Comparative Statics 
This yields useful comparative statics.90 As the probability of 
winning approaches total certainty, i.e., α → 1, the alleged 
infringer will challenge if litigation costs are less than the cost of 
licensing. 
 
Challenge if: L < CL as α → 1           (Comparative Static 1) 
 
This makes sense intuitively. As successfully challenging the 
patent becomes more likely, the costs of an unsuccessful challenge 
become less important. An interesting result from Comparative 
Static 1 is that the alleged infringer’s potential profit appears to 
have disappeared from the equation. But in actual fact, the 
alleged infringer’s potential profit is still significant as 
determinant of CL, i.e., CL = f(π). It is difficult to estimate what 
the average patent license demand is, but anecdotal evidence 
suggests that it is significantly less than the minimum threshold 
costs of patent litigation.  Probably the most plausible method of 
valuing intellectual property is known as the “income approach,” 
which views the value of an asset in terms of the present value of 
the future stream of economic benefits that can be derived from 
its ownership.91 Under this method, royalty rates are directly tied 
to the profits of the alleged infringer.92 In practice, patent license 
 90. Comparative statics is a modeling technique used in economics and 
political science. Comparative statics is the formal study of how the equilibrium 
or optimal values of the variables in a model are affected by changes in the 
values of other parameters in the model.  See KEVIN M. CURRIER, COMPARATIVE 
STATICS ANALYSIS IN ECONOMICS (2000). 
 91. See Russell L. Parr & Gordon V. Smith, Quantitative Methods of Valuing 
Intellectual Property, in THE NEW ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 58, 68  (Melvin Simensky & Lanning G. Bryer eds., 
1994). 
 92. Reasonable royalties are usually determined by the application of the 
SAG M & ROHDE K. Patent Reform and Differential Impact. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2006;8(1):1-
93.  
26 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 8:1 
 
                                                          
 
fees are frequently determined by seemingly arbitrary rules of 
thumb such as the “25 Percent Rule” or reference to past industry 
practices.93 Each of these methods is something of a 
“guesstimate”94 but it seems fair to assume that methods of 
valuation that were not a function of the alleged infringer’s 
potential profit would be displaced in the market by those that 
were. 
Although the cost of a patent license and the potential profit 
of the alleged infringer are closely tied, litigation costs are only 
weakly related to the alleged infringer’s potential profit.  
According to a recent survey conducted by the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association, litigating an individual 
patent case is likely to cost around $650,000 for a low valued 
patent and up to $4.5 million for a higher value patent.95  It is not 
surprising that parties in high stakes cases would spend more 
than those in lower stakes cases, but it is significant to note that 
litigation costs are largely insensitive to the amount in dispute  
below a certain threshold.96 
The stickiness of the lower boundary of litigation costs means 
that although licensing costs will be directly related to the alleged 
infringer’s profit potential, litigation costs will not. For example, a 
“Georgia Pacific Factors.”  See Ga. Pac. v. U.S. Plywood, 318 F. Supp. 1116 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, 
Non-Cooperative Games, and the Complex Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1191 (2003). 
 93. Denton & Heald, supra note 92, at 1190-93.  The “25 Percent Rule” is the 
popular license valuation method which holds that a licensee should pay a 
royalty equivalent to 25% of the expected profit from the product that 
incorporates the patent being licensed.  Ted Hagelin, Valuation of Patent 
Licenses, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 423, 424 (2004). 
 94. Denton & Heald, supra note 92, at 1191 (citing Robert S. Bramson, 
Valuing Patents, Technologies and Portfolios: Rules of Thumb, 635 PLI/PAT 465, 
471 (2001)). 
 95. AIPLA ECON. SURVEY, supra note 41, at 22.  For a patent valued at less 
than $1 million over its life, the cost of discovery alone approaches $350,000.  Id.  
For patents valued between $1 million and $25 million, the average costs rise to 
$1.25 million for discovery and $2 million for complete litigation.  Id.  For those 
patents which exceed $25 million in value, costs average $3 million for discovery 
and $4.5 million for litigation.  Id.  See also Bronwyn H. Hall et al., Prospects for 
Improving U.S. Patent Quality Via Post-Grant Opposition 8 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9731, 2003), available at 
http://papers.nber.org/papers/W9731.pdf (estimating legal costs of patent 
litigation ranging between $500,000 to $3 million dollars per suit or $500,000 per 
claim at issue per side). 
 96. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it costs about the same to litigate a $1 
million patent suit as it does for a patent suit where the amount at stake is only 
$500,000. 
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potential infringer contemplating challenging the validity of a 
patent has to expect that her litigation costs will amount to at 
least around $500,000,97 assuming that her profit is a mere $1 
million and that a 5% royalty is customary in her industry. She 
has to weigh that $500,000 litigation bill against a license 
demand of only $50,000. By way of counter-example, if a potential 
infringer had an expected profit of $10 million, a 5% royalty 
would lead to a license demand of $500,000, roughly the same 
value as the cost of litigation. The alleged infringer is far more 
likely to litigate in the second scenario than in the first. 
The fact that only a small proportion of patent cases actually 
end in a trial on the merits should not make us any more 
comfortable with the high cost of patent litigation. In their recent 
empirical study of the resolution of patent cases from 1995 to 
2000, Kesan and Ball find that between four and seven percent of 
cases end with a final judgment in one form or other.98  However, 
the authors also find that a further seven to eight percent of cases 
are disposed of through summary judgment. The high cost of 
patent litigation might be less concerning if those cases that 
ended in summary judgment were considerably cheaper, but the 
evidence shows that they are not. For example, examining patent 
cases filed in 1997, Kesan and Ball find that the average duration 
of cases that terminated through a trial was just under two-and-
a-half years while cases from the same year that terminated 
through a successful summary judgment ended only about two 
months sooner.99 This indicates that the high cost of patent 
litigation is not merely a factor in those rare cases that make it 
all the way to a final judgment; it also affects those cases in which 
the defendant is able to win on summary judgment. 
The inflexible nature of litigation costs at the lower boundary 
also means that the majority of patent holder assertions will 
result in licensing costs that are far less than the lower boundary 
of litigation, as illustrated in Graph 1. This graph depicts a 
density function of the distribution of potential patent cases in 
relation to the difference between litigation costs and licensing 
costs (CL – L).100 We suggest that the vast majority of potential 
infringers will face litigation costs that exceed licensing costs as 
 97. AIPLA ECON. SURVEY, supra note 41, at 22. 
 98. Jay P. Kesan, & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An 
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 
WASH. L. REV. 237, 265-69 (2006). 
 99. Id. at 64. 
 100. The density function depicted here is merely illustrative; profit is not 
necessarily normally distributed. 
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represented by the shaded area on the left-hand side of the 










GRAPH 1: POTENTIAL INFRINGERS AND THE DIFFERENCE 
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Because the majority of patent holder assertions will result 
in licensing costs that are far less than the lower boundary of 
litigation, the probability that an alleged infringer will challenge 
any given patent assertion is effectively zero in a large number of 
cases.101 Recall that the Comparative Static 1 indicated that as 
the probability of success approaches one, an alleged infringer 
would challenge if litigation costs were less than licensing costs. 
Graph 2 maps the predicted outcomes for a continuum of π given 
the distribution assumptions in Graph 1. 
 
                                                          
 101. Admittedly, some potential infringers may challenge in such a situation 
if they have a strong reputation interest in not being seen to be an easy target. 
Nonetheless, the simplified parameters of the CF-model probably capture the 
behavior of a majority of firms. 
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The result depicted in Graph 1 reflects anecdotal experience: 
at low levels of profit challenge is unlikely; at high levels of profit, 
challenge is very likely; there is a very small transition window in 
between where the probability of success is relevant to the alleged 
infringer’s determination. 
C.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHALLENGER FOCUSED MODEL 
The CF-model has at least six significant implications with 
respect to the survival of bad patents. These implications are: (1) 
the probability of successfully challenging the patent holder’s 
assertion is only a significant determinant of whether an alleged 
infringer will challenge in a limited range of cases, (2) high 
litigation costs insulate bad patents from challenge, (3) the 
uncertainties of patent litigation insulate bad patents from 
challenge, (4) information asymmetries insulate bad patents from 
challenge, (5) challenges to bad patents are likely to be an 
undersupplied public good, and (6) enhanced damages and 
injunctions have a chilling effect on patent challenges. 
1. The Limited Relevance of the Probability of Success 
The probability of successfully challenging the patent holder 
in court is only a significant determinant of whether an alleged 
infringer will challenge in a limited range of cases.  To begin with, 
if the cost of licensing is lower than the minimum threshold of 
litigation, it never makes sense to challenge. Furthermore, if the 
patent holder’s royalty demands are high enough, it makes sense 
to challenge their patent in court almost regardless of the 
probability of success (depending on the salience of penalties for 
challenging unsuccessfully, discussed below). 
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2. High Litigation Costs Insulate Bad Patents from Challenge 
Bad patents can remain unchallenged as long as the royalties 
demanded are less than the minimum threshold of litigation 
costs. Patent holders are in the driver’s seat in this regard 
because they get to determine what license fees they will demand, 
and they do so in full knowledge of the litigation costs faced by 
alleged infringers. Strategic patent holders can also effect the 
alleged infringer’s decision to challenge by raising the costs of 
challenging by seeking a temporary injunction and/or 
establishing a reputation for demanding extravagant license fees 
at the conclusion of fully litigated cases.102 
The costs of litigation cannot be measured purely in terms of 
lawyer’s fees. In most cases, serious patent litigation distracts key 
personnel from their core responsibilities. For example, Research 
In Motion, the Canadian company at the center of the recent 
Blackberry litigation was described as “critically distracted” by 
the protracted litigation.103 Patent litigation can also have a 
negative effect on relations with outside investors, either in terms 
of the stock price for publicly traded companies or the availability 
of venture capital financing for smaller companies. The mere 
public announcement of a patent law suit can depress the 
defendant’s stock price on average two to three percent,104 and 
sometimes much more.105  In addition, the lingering cloud of 
patent litigation can be especially harmful to small firms, 
particularly those firms with limited product diversity.106  The 
 102. The Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. may 
allow district courts to take this into account when assessing the equities of 
granting an injunction to patent holders.  126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006) (holding 
that well-established principles of equity require a plaintiff seeking permanent 
injunction under the Patent Act  to satisfy a four-factor test before a court may 
grant such relief). 




 104. Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Costs of Inefficient Bargaining and Financial 
Distress: Evidence from Corporate Lawsuits, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 221, 223, 230-31, 
239 (1994); see also Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. 
& ECON. 463, 471 (1995). 
 105. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy 
from Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 10 
(2005) (noting that in the pharmaceutical industry losses have gone as high as 
30% when news of unfavorable rulings emerged). 
 106. See Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Predatory 
Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 573, 575-76 (2001). 
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extraordinary length of time it takes to invalidate a patent 
through litigation – 8.6 years on average – exacerbates this 
problem considerably.107 
It is difficult to precisely measure the total costs of patent 
litigation, but according to one rough estimate, the total direct 
cost of patent litigation in the United States every year exceeds 
$2 billion.108  This figure excludes money actually paid by way of 
settlement or final judgment.109 As noted above, the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association Economic Survey places 
the average cost of patent litigation at around $650,000 for a low 
valued patent and up to $4.5 million for a higher value patent.110 
As long as the minimum threshold of litigation costs remains 
high, bad patent holders will be able to avoid challenge by simply 
pitching the license demands below the cost of litigation. Any 
patent reform that reduced the minimum threshold of litigation 
costs would greatly decrease the ability of patent holders to do 
this.111 
3. The Uncertainties of Patent Litigation Insulate Bad Patents 
from Challenge 
The CF-model addresses the potential infringer’s probability 
of successfully challenging a patent as opposed to the validity of 
the asserted patent per se. A number of factors combine to 
produce the result that the alleged infringer’s probability of 
winning and the probability that the patent is valid are not the 
same thing. The alleged infringer’s probability of successfully 
challenging the patent is not directly linked to validity because of 
the uncertain nature of patent litigation and the considerable 
risks of judicial error. As a normative matter, most patent 
challengers are confident that they should win; however the 
nature of patent litigation is such that very few can ever be sure 
as a predictive matter that they will successfully challenge a 
particular patent.  All litigation is uncertain to some extent, but 
anecdotal reports from judges and patent lawyers indicate that 
 107. Lemley, supra note 22, at 1520. (finding that the average time from 
patent issuance to a final litigated decision on validity is 8.6 years). 
 108. Id. at 1502. 
 109. Id. 
 110. AIPLA ECON. SURVEY, supra note 41, at 22. (For a patent valued at less 
than $1M over its life, the cost of discovery alone approaches $350,000.  For 
patents valued between $1M and $25M, the average costs rise to $1.25M for 
discovery and $2M for complete litigation.  For those patents which exceed $25M 
in value, costs average $3M for discovery and $4.5M for litigation). 
 111. The effectiveness of post-grant review in this regard is discussed infra 
notes 253-57 and accompanying text. 
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patent litigation is a particularly uncertain form of legal action.112 
The Uncertainty of Claim Construction 
Although there are many causes of uncertainty in patent 
litigation, the claim construction process is arguably the most 
significant. Claim construction is the critical stage of patent 
litigation where the court decides what the words describing the 
patent holder’s rights actually mean. Every patent includes “one 
or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming 
the subject matter which the applicant regards as her 
invention.”113 These claims define the boundaries of the patent 
holder’s rights with respect to the invention. Because language is 
ambiguous and the path of technology is unpredictable, however, 
there will often be disagreements between plaintiffs and 
defendants as to the precise meaning of the patent claims. In the 
context of a patent claim, even seemingly straightforward words 
such as “a,” “or,” “to,” and “when” become the subject of contested 
argument.  In the recent Federal Circuit decision in Phillips v. 
AWH, the court wrestled with the question of whether the term 
“baffles” should be given its ordinary meaning as a “means for 
obstructing, impeding, or checking the flow of something” or 
whether it should be read restrictively based on the patent’s 
written description to exclude structures that extend at a ninety-
degree angle from the walls.114 To an outside observer this is 
indeed baffling. 
Before 1996, claim construction was regarded as a mixed 
question of fact and law. However, in Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, the Supreme Court determined that claim 
construction was a question of law.115  By making claim 
construction a question of law, the effect of Markman has been to 
significantly increase the Federal Circuit’s discretion in reviewing 
claim construction. 
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has not settled on a 
consistent methodology for claim construction, leading to 
 112. See, e.g., Douglas J. Kline, Patent Litigation: The Sport of Kings, TECH. 
REV., Apr. 28, 2004, at http://www.technologyreview.com/ BizTech/13562/ 
(describing patent litigation as complex, uncertain, and expensive). 
 113. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
 114. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The 
patented invention pertained to modular, steel-shell panels that could be welded 
together to form vandalism-resistant walls. See U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798. 
 115. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996), aff’g 
52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
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significant doctrinal instability and confusion in the lower 
courts.116 Indeed, Federal Circuit reversal of Markman decisions 
has become so routine that many judges and attorneys wonder 
why they bother with claim construction hearings at all.  At least 
one district court judge has expressed the view that “the only 
thing that really is predictable in this area of the law is that we 
district judges will likely get it wrong, or at least that the Federal 
Circuit will say that we got it wrong.”117 Confirming this 
pessimism, Christian Chu finds that for cases involving claim 
construction filed between January 1, 1998, and April 30, 2000, 
the Federal Circuit modified the district court judge’s claim 
interpretation in 44% of cases and reversed it in 30% of cases.118 
Ostensibly, a Markman hearing should give parties a firm 
understanding of what subject matter is covered by the patent at 
issue.  Unfortunately, the significant chance that any claim 
interpretation made by a district court judge will be overturned or 
revised on appeal dilutes the effectiveness of the Markman 
process.  In reality the scope of the patent is unclear at every 
stage, from issuance through litigation and appeal.  In essence, 
parties must proceed through the decision making and litigation 
process with often erroneous claim and scope interpretations.119 
The claim construction process is also rendered uncertain for 
potential infringers by the doctrine of equivalents. Under the 
doctrine of equivalents, a court will extend the scope of the patent 
holder’s rights beyond the literal language of the patent claim to 
cover an infringing product or process that is unsubstantially 
different120 or “performs substantially the same function in 
 116. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit 
Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1105 (2004). 
 117. Honorable Kathleen M. O'Malley et al., Panel Discussion: Claim 
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 
671, 672 (2004). 
 118. Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim 
Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001); see also Cybor 
Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 n.16 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Rader, 
J., dissenting) (noting that 37.3% of all claim constructions reversed in whole or 
in part since Markman I); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges 
Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2-3 (2001) (“District 
court judges improperly construe patent claim terms in 33% of the cases appealed 
to the Federal Circuit.”). 
 119. See Moore, supra note 118, at 2-3. (“In the absence of a route for 
expedited appeal of claim construction, district courts are forced to proceed with 
lengthy and expensive patent litigation based on their frequently erroneous claim 
construction.”). 
 120. Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus., 126 F.3d 1420, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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substantially the same way to obtain the same result.”121 The 
doctrine of equivalents is intended to protect the patent holder 
from “unscrupulous copyists” who would otherwise evade a patent 
holder’s rights by making minimal modifications to the patented 
product or process.122 However, in reality the doctrine of 
equivalents probably does more to protect patent holders from the 
incompetence of their attorneys than anything else. The Supreme 
Court argues that the inherent ambiguity of language and the 
unpredictable path of technological innovation require some 
flexibility be extended to patent holders in the form of the 
doctrine of equivalents.123 However, as the Supreme Court 
acknowledged, the doctrine of equivalents itself exacerbates the 
ambiguity of claim language.124 As Josh Sarnoff explains, the 
modern doctrine of equivalents extends a patent’s scope beyond 
questions of identity of “whether the product or process is an 
embodiment of the claimed category” to the open-ended question 
of similarity.125 
The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel neutralizes the 
expansive effect of the doctrine of equivalents with respect to 
claims that have been narrowed during the course of patent 
prosecution.126 Under this doctrine, a patentee who narrows her 
claims at an earlier stage of litigation is estopped from later 
arguing that the subject matter covered by the original, broader 
claim that was nothing more than an equivalent.127 However, 
prosecution history estoppel itself is limited and uncertain. 
Consequently, although prosecution history estoppel might in 
 121. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 
(1950) (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)). 
 122. Id. at 607. 
 123. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 
731-732 (2002). 
 124. Festo, 535 U.S. at 732.  (“the doctrine of equivalents renders the scope of 
patents less certain.”); see also Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of 
Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J 1157 
(2004) (arguing for the abolition of the doctrine of equivalents). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Festo, 535 U.S. at 727  (noting that when the patentee responds to the 
rejection by narrowing her claims, this prosecution history estops him from later 
arguing that the subject matter covered by the original, broader claim was 
nothing more than an equivalent). 
 127. See id. at 733-34 (“When, however, the patentee originally claimed the 
subject matter alleged to infringe but then narrowed the claim in response to a 
rejection, he may not argue that the surrendered territory comprised unforeseen 
subject matter that should be deemed equivalent to the literal claims of the 
issued patent.”). 
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some senses be described as an antidote to the expansive effect of 
the doctrine of equivalents, it is by no means an antidote to the 
uncertainty and confusion that equivalents add to the already 
uncertain arena of claim interpretation. 
The Presumption of Validity 
A second significant cause of uncertainty in patent litigation 
is the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the presumption of 
validity. According to the Federal Circuit, a defendant seeking to 
invalidate a patent must do more than cast significant doubt on 
the patent’s validity; she must prove by “clear and convincing 
evidence” that the patent is invalid.128  Although the current 
Patent Act clearly establishes that an issued patent carries a 
presumption of validity,129 it is only by virtue of case law that this 
presumption has been elevated to the high standard of clear and 
convincing evidence. This heightened standard of proof might 
make sense if patents were subject to a more rigorous system of 
examination, but given the very limited nature of patent 
examination at the Patent Office, it is particularly hard to defend 
as a matter of principle.130 
The clear and convincing evidence standard increases a 
potential challenger’s uncertainty because, although in theory a 
defendant could simply factor the heightened standard into her 
risk calculations, the practicality of doing so is another matter 
entirely. Even if the alleged infringer possesses what she believes 
to be “killer” prior art – for example, something that shows that 
the supposed invention had already been described in a printed 
publication well before the patent owner’s claimed invention date 
– she must still ask herself whether this evidence will meet the 
gold standard of clear and convincing evidence. It is entirely 
possible that a reasonably competent patent examiner would find 
that the prior art anticipated the invention, but that a jury faced 
 128. See, e.g., Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (invalidity must be established by facts supported by clear and convincing 
evidence). 
 129. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (providing in relevant part that, “[a] patent shall 
be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent . . . shall be presumed valid 
independently of the validity of other claims . . . . The burden of establishing 
invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such 
invalidity.”);  see also New England Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 
F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The presumption acts as a procedural device 
which places the burden of going forward with evidence and the ultimate burden 
of persuasion of invalidity at trial on the alleged infringer.”). 
 130. See supra, Part II-A. 
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with the same evidence would be unconvinced.131  Given that 
juries in patent cases are comprised of lay people who are 
unfamiliar with both the relevant law and the relevant 
technology, it is hard to know confidently ex ante whether the 
most convincing evidence in the world will actually prove to be 
clear and convincing in a court room setting. This intuition is 
borne out in studies of jury decisions in patent cases, which 
indicate that patent owners are significantly more likely to win at 
jury trials than otherwise.132 
As the MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. case illustrates, 
once a bad patent issues it is much easier to convince the Patent 
Office of its error than it is to defend an allegation of 
infringement at a jury trial.133 Although eBay lost on the merits 
in federal court,134 it was far more successful in inter partes 
reexamination in the Patent Office. In January 2005, the Patent 
Office issued an initial ruling rejecting all of the claims contained 
in MercExchange’s online auctions patent.135 In March 2005, the 
Patent Office issued an initial ruling rejecting all of the claims 
contained in the MercExchange electronic consignment systems 
patent.136 Then in May 2005, the Patent Office issued an initial 
ruling rejecting all of the claims contained in the MercExchange 
multiple database searching.137 These were all patents that eBay 
had already been found to have infringed in its jury trial in the 
Eastern District of Virginia.138 
The Effect of Uncertainty 
The uncertainty of patent litigation is significant because it 
reduces the alleged infringer’s expectation of successfully 
challenging a bad patent. Put simply, the alleged infringer may 
 131. See infra notes 134–38 and accompanying text. 
 132. See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries and Patent Cases: An Empirical 
Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 368 (2000) (concluding that 
juries are significantly pro-patentee in suits for infringement). 
 133. See eBay Inc. Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 30 (Feb. 24, 2006). 
 134. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 135. See eBay Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 30 (Feb. 24, 2006). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Note that the Federal Circuit also invalidated all claims asserted against 
eBay and its subsidiaries arising out of the multiple database search patent, but 
reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment in eBay’s favor 
regarding the auction patent. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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have a well founded objective belief that a patent is invalid, but 
she can never be very sure of what the patent claims will be taken 
to mean or how much evidence will be required to overcome the 
clear and convincing evidence standard. This uncertainty clearly 
disadvantages risk averse parties and it also makes threats by 
patent holders to pursue litigation more credible because almost 
no assertion of rights by a patent holder is too far-fetched. 
4. Information Asymmetries Insulate Bad Patents from Challenge 
Information asymmetries insulate bad patents from 
challenge by deterring alleged infringers from challenging bad 
patents through the extra informational costs the assymetries 
impose. An essential problem with bad patents is differentiating 
them from good patents. When an alleged infringer receives a 
threat letter, she may have very little information upon which to 
assess its merits.  In contrast, the patent owner generally has 
much greater knowledge of the validity and scope of her patent.  
She knows things such as the amount of effort that was made to 
research the prior art before the patent was filed, her success in 
extracting license fees from other targets, and the strength of the 
patent in light of the known prior art. She is also familiar with 
the patent’s prosecution history – including any narrowed claims. 
These information asymmetries are such that, at least at the 
early stages, a weak lawsuit may be difficult to distinguish from a 
strong lawsuit.  An alleged infringer can do a number of things to 
investigate the quality of a patent that is threatened against her: 
she can hire lawyers to research the patent, she can hire 
engineers to research the technology, and/or she can gather 
information on her own through public and private sources.  All of 
these activities may change her evaluation of how likely she is to 
successfully challenge the patent holder, but only by increasing 
the alleged infringer’s information costs. Furthermore, some 
information asymmetries can only be overcome through 
discovery, which means spending several hundred thousand 
dollars on litigation. 
5. Challenges to Bad Patents are Likely to be an Undersupplied 
Public Good 
As several commentators have observed, the Supreme Court’s 
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois 
Foundation decision creates an ironic public good problem for any 
individual who seeks to challenge the validity of a patent.139  
 139. 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (holding that a finding of patent invalidity 
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Although an alleged infringer must bear the whole burden of 
pursuing her claim of invalidity, if she wins she must share the 
benefits of her labor with the whole world, including all her 
competitors.140 This suggests that unless alleged infringers can 
find some method of coordinating, they will not supply the 
optimum level of resistance to the demands of patent owners.141 
A related problem is that in some markets, the alleged 
infringer’s utility from successfully challenging a patent may be 
overstated by the CF-model explored in this section. Some alleged 
infringers will be able to simple pass royalty costs through to the 
consumer, as long as their competitors are also subject to the 
same costs.142 Furthermore, some alleged infringers may use the 
threat of patent litigation as an opportunity to raise their rivals’ 
costs by settling patent disputes early at a discount.143 If two 
parties are involved in patent litigation, and both realize that the 
invalidation challenge will be successful, each party actually has 
an incentive to settle the litigation through licensing.  The patent 
holder’s incentive is obvious due to Blonder-Tongue: if she settles 
with the defendant, she maintains some chance of enforcing the 
patent against future defendants.144 Not quite so obvious is the 
fact that the alleged infringer’s incentive to settle can be just as 
compelling, even if her expectation of victory is high.145  An 
alleged infringer who settles cheaply cannot only avoid sharing 
her victory with her competitors, she can actually impose a higher 
cost on those competitors if the appearance of settlement 
during litigation applies to all, not just to the benefit of the challenging party).  A 
public good is a good which is both non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Non-
rivalrous goods can be consumed by one person without reducing the 
consumption of others. Non-excludable goods cannot be effectively fenced off so as 
to prevent others from enjoying them. Lighthouses, sunsets and national defense 
are common examples of public goods. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of 
Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387 (1954); see also Matthew 
Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright Scope and 
Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187, 193 (2006). 
 140. Miller, supra note 22, at; John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective 
Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
305, 333.  Note that non-infringement is not necessarily a public good because it 
may only be the unique activities of an individual that are in fact non-infringing. 
 141. Miller, supra note 22, at 668-673 (“forced sharing undermines an alleged 
infringer’s reason for fighting the patent case to the finish— especially if the 
patent owner offers an attractive settlement.”). 
 142. Farrell & Merges, supra note 22, at 943. 
 143. See id. at 954–55. 
 144. See id. at 968. 
 145. See id. at 955-56. 
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increases their perception of the validity of the patent.146 
In their article examining incentives to challenge and defend 
patents, Farrell and Merges point to the case of Gilbert Hyatt’s 
negotiations with North American Philips Corporation as an 
example of how settlement may be leveraged in infringement 
proceedings.147  Gilbert Hyatt was a non-manufacturing patent 
holder who sought royalties from manufacturers in the LCD 
industry.  Many of the targeted competitors considered litigation, 
but Phillips Corporation chose to settle the dispute early, in 
return for beneficial terms.148  As part of the settlement, Phillips 
agreed to help Hyatt extract royalties from other competitors in 
the field.149 
Joseph Miller highlights a different example150 of the 
incentive-to-settle using the Amazon.com “one-click” patent case 
against Barnesandnoble.com.151  The district court found 
Amazon.com’s “one-click” patent valid and issued an injunction 
against Barnesandnoble.com’s use of that feature on its website. 
However, the Federal Circuit later vacated the preliminary 
injunction and concluded that Barnesandnoble.com had “mounted 
a substantial challenge to the validity of the patent.”152  While 
not formally deciding the invalidity of the patent, the Federal 
Circuit remanded the decision back to the district court with what 
amounted to a step-by-step explanation of how and why the 
district court was to invalidate the patent.153  Instead of pursuing 
the almost certain invalidation of Amazon.com’s patent in the 
district court, Barnesandnoble.com settled the case, leaving the 
patent on the books as a credible threat against future 
booksellers who may have sought to compete with Amazon.com or 
Barnesandnoble.com.154 
The combined effect of the public good nature of challenging a 
patent and the pass-through problem means that not only will 
potential infringers have sub-optimal incentives to challenge a 
 146. Later licensees will typically pay greater licensing fees than those who 
were early to the table. 
 147. Farrell & Merges, supra note 22, at 970 n. 32. 
 148. Philips Licenses Hyatt’s Microcomputer Patents, PATENT WORLD, Dec. 
1991 / Jan. 1992, at 15. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Miller, supra note 22. 
 151. Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (W.D. 
Wash. 1999), vacated, 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 152. Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
 153. Miller, supra note 22, at 671-72. 
 154. Id. at 672. 
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patent in the first place, but that even when they do it will almost 
certainly be in their interests to accept a settlement at some stage 
before a final judgment is entered. Consequently, even if bad 
patents are initially challenged, we should not be confident that 
potential infringers will pursue those challenges to completion. 
6. The Chilling Effect of Enhanced Damages and Injunctions 
The CF-model set forth in the previous section155 shows that 
the penalties associated with an unsuccessful challenge become 
increasingly significant as the probability of successfully 
challenging the patent falls. Since its formation, the Federal 
Circuit has tended to exacerbate these penalties through its 
increased willingness to order preliminary and final 
injunctions,156 award enhanced damages for willful 
infringement,157 and its greater flexibility in calculating patent 
damages in general.158 
The possibility of a preliminary injunction can have a 
substantial chilling effect on a potential infringer’s willingness to 
pursue litigation. The effect of a preliminary injunction has been 
described as “the financial equivalent of nuclear winter” because 
of the economic hardship and disruption it imposes on 
defendants.159 Furthermore, settlements and royalties negotiated 
in the shadow of an injunction are likely to be distorted where the 
patent relates only to a small component of some larger product 
(or service) but has the ability to hold-up the entirety.160 
Despite the Federal Circuit’s recognition that a preliminary 
injunction is “a drastic and extraordinary remedy that is not to be 
routinely granted,”161 the court now routinely issues preliminary 
injunctions162 in patent infringement cases.163  In a 1983 case, 
 155. See supra Part II. B.2. 
 156. See Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 106, at 575–76. 
 157. See Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 
1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (imposing an affirmative duty on potential infringer with 
actual notice of patent holder’s rights to exercise due care to determine whether 
or not she is infringing those rights). 
 158. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 2 (2001). 
 159. Michelle Armond,  Introducing the Defense of Independent Invention to 
Motions for Preliminary Injunctions in Patent Infringement Lawsuits, 91 CAL. L. 
REV. 117, 120 (2003) (citing Brenda Sandburg, Trolling for Dollars, SAN 
FRANCISCO RECORDER, July 30, 2001, at 1). 
 160. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 38. 
 161. Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 162. The court’s authority with respect to preliminary injunctions is found in 
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Smith International, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., the Federal Circuit 
held that an immediate irreparable harm to the patent holder 
should be presumed whenever the validity and continuing 
infringement of the patent had been established.164  Since then, 
the court has further stated that “[t]he presumption of 
irreparable harm [now] acts as a procedural device which places 
the ultimate burden of production on the question of irreparable 
harm onto the alleged infringer.”165  This stance is inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay,166 and will likely be 
reversed in the near future. 
The distorting effect of the threat of treble damages and 
attorney’s fees for willful infringement is widely recognized. 
According to Federal Circuit case law, the application of treble 
damages and attorney’s fees is appropriate where an infringer 
had “actual notice of [the plaintiff’s] patent rights” and failed “to 
exercise due care to determine whether or not [she was] 
infringing” upon those rights.167 However, the Federal Circuit’s 
broad interpretation of “actual notice” makes this a significant 
risk.168 
D. DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT AND THE CHALLENGER FOCUSED MODEL 
The CF-model illustrates that it is easy for bad patents to go 
unchallenged because of certain structural features of modern 
patent litigation. High litigation costs, uncertainty in litigation, 
information asymmetries, the public good problem, and the 
enhanced penalties of losing a court challenge all deter alleged 
infringers from mounting a challenge to the validity of the patent 
holder’s rights. The cumulative effect of these factors is that the 
overall incentive for any given potential infringer to challenge a 
patent is often very weak, even if the probability that the patent 
is invalid is very high. 
The CF-model predicts that an alleged infringer will 
challenge the patent holder if the cost of litigation is less than or 
35 U.S.C. § 283 (2005) (“[C]ourts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may 
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the 
violation of any right secured by patent . . . .”). 
 163. Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 106, at 575-76. 
 164. 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 165. Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(citing Roper Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 757 F.2d 1266, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 166. See eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1837. 
 167. Underwater Devices Inc., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Enhanced 
damages are provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
 168. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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equal to the probability of winning multiplied by the cost of the 
license plus the probability of losing multiplied by the penalties 
associated with an unsuccessful challenge to the patent such as 
increased royalty rates and enhanced damages for willful 
infringement. Or, in terms of the notation, 
 
Challenge if: L < αCL + (1-α) (CP + P)                (Equation 1) 
 
All other things being equal, the higher litigation costs rise, 
the less likely an alleged infringer will be to challenge. As noted 
above, when probability of success is very high, the most 
important factor determining whether an alleged infringer will 
challenge is the ratio of litigation costs to licensing costs. If patent 
holders can keep their royalty demands at less than the cost of 
litigation, alleged infringers are unlikely to challenge, no matter 
how confident they are of winning.  If the minimum threshold for 
litigation is several hundred thousand dollars, keeping patent 
royalty demands below this amount is easy for the patent holder 
to do.  If the minimum threshold for litigation was considerably 
less, as it would be under the system of post-grant review set 
forth in Part IV, it would be very difficult for the holders of bad 
patents to rely on licensee capitulation.169 
As discussed in the previous section, the CF-model shows 
that the alleged infringer’s prospects of success are often not 
significant in deciding whether to challenge a patent. 
Furthermore, even where the prospects of success are a 
significant factor in the alleged infringer’s decision making 
process, they are only indirectly related to the validity of the 
underlying patent because of the uncertainties of patent litigation 
and information asymmetries. This is an important insight of the 
CF-model, but it is also important to understand that the lack of 
relevance of the validity of the underlying patent applies equally 
to good patents as to bad patents. Much of the reform literature 
advocates reducing the structural disincentives to challenge bad 
patents without acknowledging the role these features play in 
protecting good patents. The same factors that insulate bad 
patents from challenge are also a significant component of the 
value of all patents – whether they are good or bad. 
We cannot be assured that all reforms that make patents 
easier to challenge will in fact have a differential impact on bad 
 169. See infra Part IV. 
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patents because, under the current system, the holders of good 
patents have almost as much to fear from a challenge to the 
validity of their patents as bad patent holders. This may seem 
counter-intuitive, but recall that the label “bad patent” is not 
synonymous with invalid patent.170  Bad patents are those which 
are asserted to cover products or activities that no reasonable fact 
finder could find they did in fact cover – either because the patent 
was obviously invalid, or because the patent claims were 
obviously too narrow to support such an assertion. 
Figure 1, below, represents four patents on a sliding scale of 
patent validity. The closer a patent is to the left hand side of the 
scale the more likely it is to be upheld by a court. Consider the 
following four patents; Patent A has a 95% chance of being found 
to be valid, Patent B has 60% chance, Patent C has a 50% chance 
and Patent D has a 5% chance.171 As illustrated in Figure 1, 
Patent D is clearly a bad patent. In contrast, although Patents B 
and C may ultimately be found invalid if subject to litigation, they 
are not bad patents.172 Many good patents will turn out to be 
invalid (or not infringed) once put to the test of litigation because 
of the vagaries of claim construction and other shifts in patent 
doctrine. Furthermore, a certain percentage of valid good patents 
are likely to be incorrectly invalidated (or found not infringed) 
due to judicial error. Reforms that uniformly lower the cost of 
litigation or make patents easier to challenge will not only place 
greater pressure on Patent D; they will also significantly affect 
the value of Patent B and Patent C which are not bad patents. 
 
FIGURE 1: SLIDING SCALE OF PATENT VALIDITY 
 
Valid Invalid
A B C D
 
                                                          
 170. See supra Part I.B-1. 
 171. Figure 1 is constructed in terms of patent validity, however, it could also 
be redrawn in terms of the likelihood that a particular patent claim covered the 
alleged infringer’s business: i.e. while the infringer has a 95% chance of being 
found to infringe Patent A, it only has a 5% chance of being found liable for 
infringing Patent D. 
 172. Again, the analysis is the same for hyper-assertion. 
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The strong form of the differential impact test requires that 
any change to the patent system will devalue Patent D, but will 
not significantly effect the value of Patents A, B and C as 
represented in Figure 1. Differential impact favors reforms that 
will expose patents that are very likely to be invalid (or hyper-
asserted) to greater scrutiny, but recognizes that even the holders 
of good patents have a lot to lose from patent litigation. The CF-
model is very useful for explaining why bad patents survive, but 
in order to identify reform proposals that will reduce the value of 
bad patents without affecting the value of good patents, we need a 
model that focuses on the patent holder’s incentive to assert bad 
patents rather than the alleged infringer’s incentive to challenge 
them.  In the next section we present an assertion focused model 
(“AF-model”) which does just that. 
E. AN ASSERTION FOCUSED MODEL 
In this section we present a new model for analyzing patent 
reform proposals. Instead of focusing on the potential infringer’s 
incentive to challenge a patent, this new model focuses on the 
patent holder’s incentive to assert her patent, including the 
relationship of the incentive to assert to the quality of the 
underlying patent. We begin with the proposition that a rational 
patent holder will assert her rights so long as the expected value 
of assertion is greater than the expected cost. 
Variable Definitions: 
 γ = Probability of target accepting a license.173 
 π = Profit to patent holder from licensing the 
patent. 
 T = Cost to patent holder to locate and engage 
potential licensees (a.k.a. targets). 
 R = Cost to patent holder from retaliation by the 
target. 
 δ = Probability of retaliation by target. 
The patent holder’s utility in asserting her patent is a 
                                                          
 173. γ is the reciprocal of α in the CF-model. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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function of the cost of finding a target (T), the probability that the 
target will accept a license (γ), the licensing revenue the patent 
holder will derive if the target accepts the license (π), and the 
expected cost of retaliation (δR).174 
Utility function: 
The patent holder’s utility in asserting her patent can be 
expressed in terms of the notation as follows: 
 
UAssert: γ(π – T) – (1 – γ)( T + δR) 
 
In other words, when a patent owner persuades a target to 
accept a license, she gains licensing fees which must be off-set 
against the cost of identifying and engaging with the target; when 
a patent owner fails to persuade a target to accept a license, she 
loses her investment in identifying and engaging with the target 
and suffers the consequences of any retaliatory actions that her 
assertion may provoke. 
The possibility of retaliation is the cornerstone of this model. 
Every assertion of right by the patent holder carries with it some 
possibility that the target will retaliate. When a patent holder 
sends an infringement notice to an alleged infringer, she hopes 
that the target will agree to her demands without complaint. 
However, with each new potential licensee the patent owner also 
faces a risk that the target will not only try to evade paying 
license fees, but that it will also attempt to reduce or entirely 
eradicate the commercial value of the patent. The most obvious 
form of retaliation a target can inflict is to bring an action for 
declaratory judgment that the patent is both invalid and not 
infringed. Another more subtle form of retaliation includes 
publicly defying the patent, thus forcing the patent owner to 
either sue or implicitly acknowledge it is unable to enforce its 
claims. 
The patent holder will assert if 
 
UAssert > 0 
 
γ(π - T) > (1 - γ)(T + δR) 
 
Restated in terms of the expected cost of retaliation yields: 
 174. δ is the probability of retaliation by the target, and R is the cost of 
retaliation, thus δR is the expected cost of retaliation. 
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Assert if: δR < (γπ – T)/(1 - γ)                              (Equation 2) 
 
The most important implication of this model is that where 
targeting costs are low and the prospect of retaliation is small, 
this inequality will almost always be met. Accordingly, a rational 
patent holder will broadly assert her patent in these 
circumstances, even where the probability that any individual 
target will accept a license is low. In many cases patent holders 
have an incentive to broadly assert patent rights regardless of the 
low quality of the patent or the low probability that any one 
potential infringer will accept a license. Indeed, as the AF-model 
predicts, technology industry leaders frequently complain that 
they are deluged with meritless patent assertions.175 
F. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ASSERTION FOCUSED MODEL FOR PATENT 
REFORM 
To reiterate, the AF-model provides some interesting insights 
for patent reform. The model predicts that where targeting costs 
are low and the expected cost of retaliation is small, a rational 
patent holder will broadly assert her patent, even where the 
probability that a target will accept a license is low. The model 
also indicates that a patent holder’s incentive to assert her patent 
increases as the target’s probability of accepting a license 
increases. Accordingly, patent reform can have a differential 
impact on bad patents in any one of three ways: (1) increasing the 
targeting costs of bad patent holders without increasing the 
targeting costs of good patent holders, (2) reducing the probability 
that alleged infringers targeted by bad patent holders will accept 
a license without reducing the probability that alleged infringers 
targeted by good patent holders will accept a license, or (3) 
increasing the expected cost of retaliation for asserting a bad 
patent without increasing the expected cost of retaliation for 
asserting a good patent. This final possibility – engineering 
expected cost of retaliation for asserting a bad patent – appears to 
be the most promising option for the reasons that follow. 
First, while creating a differential impact with respect to 
 175. See, e.g., Edited and Excerpted Transcript of the Symposium on Ideas 
into Action: Implementing Reform of the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1053, 1153 (2003).  One general counsel lamented “if I had a dollar for every 
letter that either we never heard from again or never responded when we wrote 
to them, we would be rich.” Id. at 1153 
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targeting costs is theoretically possible, none of the reforms 
surveyed in this article (nor any others we are aware of) would 
seem likely to have this effect. 
Second, the potential to create a differential impact in terms 
of the probability that alleged infringers targeted by bad patent 
holders will accept a license is limited because the patent holder 
often has a significant degree of control with respect to that 
variable. Patent holders who can choose the identity of their 
targets have a substantial degree of control over the probability of 
retaliation. A target’s propensity to accept a license will depend in 
part on the cost of the license; the more the patent holder 
demands from the target, the more likely it is that the target will 
refuse to pay.176  A potential infringer’s propensity to accept a 
license will also depend on how effectively it has been targeted; 
the more accurately the patent holder identifies her potential 
targets and the more effort she expends to make her threats of 
litigation credible, the more likely it is that a target will opt to 
license. For extractive patent holders, both of these are factors 
within the patent holder’s control. So, in terms of the notation, γ = 
f(π,T). Furthermore, sophisticated patent holders will seek out 
those targets with the lowest probability of retaliation and/or the 
lowest ability to inflict significant retaliatory costs and send them 
an “offer to negotiate a license” letter. Once a few licensees have 
signed up, the patent holder can expect γ (the probability that the 
target will accept a license) to rise and δ (the probability of 
retaliation by the target) to fall among new targets as word gets 
out that other licensees have signed up or the patent holder 
develops a market reputation.  This reputation can be as much for 
litigiousness as for the quality of their patents. 
Third, creating a differential impact in terms of the 
probability that alleged infringers targeted by bad patent holders 
will accept a license also has limited potential because of 
uncertainty and information asymmetries. In an ideal world a 
target’s willingness to accept a license would depend on the 
nature of the patent assertion – they would reject bad patent 
assertions and seek to invalidate them through litigation. 
However, as the CF-model indicates, uncertainty and information 
asymmetries discourage alleged infringers from challenging 
patents. In fact, because uncertainty and information 
asymmetries have a leveling out effect, they increase the target’s 
willingness to accept a license from bad patent holders and 
 176. This is subject to the obvious caveat that the holders of bad patents must 
not seek license fees so low that they tip off the target that the patentee’s claims 
are unsupportable. 
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reduce their willingness to accept a license from good patent 
holders.177 
In the face of substantial information asymmetries, a 
target is likely to over-estimate the validity of bad patents and 
underestimate the validity of good patents. In other words, if all 
patents look the same to an alleged infringer, its willingness to 
accept a license will be unrelated to the underlying quality of the 
patent. If the holder of a good patent knows the patent to be good, 
it is in her best interests to communicate this information to the 
target.  Alternatively, if the holder of a bad patent knows her 
assertions are lacking in foundation, it is in her best interests to 
restrict any information about the quality or scope of the patent.  
But the problem faced by good patent holders is that whatever 
steps they take to communicate the quality of their patent to the 
target will be imitated by bad patent holders. It is difficult to 
conceive of reforms to the current system that reduce γ for bad 
patent holders without similarly affecting good patent holders.178 
Finally, changing the patent system to have a differential 
impact on the probability that alleged infringers targeted by bad 
patent holders will accept a license is unrealistic; however, 
reforming the system in a manner that allows the expected value 
of retaliation faced by good patents to diverge from that of bad 
patents is more feasible. The introduction of a system of post-
grant review will expose all patent holders to an increased threat 
of challenge – in terms of the model it will increase δ. But what is 
significant is that, as long as the system is designed correctly, the 
expected costs of retaliation will fall far more heavily on bad 
patent holders than on good patent holders. In terms of the 
model, RBad > RGood.179 
We expect post-grant review to impose higher costs on bad 
patents because it allows patents to be reviewed for obvious 
errors at an early stage. In our view, post-grant review will be 
most effective if it operates as an alternative to litigation that 
seeks to weed out the most clearly improvidently granted patents, 
as opposed to seeking to identify every single improvidently 
granted patent. If this high threshold of invalidity is adhered to 
validly granted patents should not be at substantial risk.180 We 
 177. See infra Part III.C.3. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See infra Part IV.B. 
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also expect post-grant review to impose higher costs on bad 
patents because good patents will actually be advantaged by post-
grant review. Post-grant review will reduce uncertainty and 
information asymmetries relating to patent quality because 
patents that survive post-grant review are more likely to be taken 
seriously in the market than ones that have never been tested.  In 
this way, post-grant review provides a signal of patent quality for 
good patents that bad patent holders face great costs in imitating. 
G. THE RELEVANCE OF ECONOMIC MODELS TO PATENT REFORM 
In Part I of this article we argued that Congressional action 
on patent reform should be targeted towards implementing the 
reforms most likely to have a differential impact on bad patents. 
Ideally, patents are issued to the creators of new, useful, and non-
obvious inventions to give them an incentive to invest resources 
in innovation where they would not do so otherwise. However, a 
considerable number of patents are issued that do not meet the 
standards of patentability and do not encourage investment in 
innovation. In this Part, we sought to explain both the origin and 
survival of bad patents. Specifically, we discussed why the Patent 
Office issues invalid and uncertain patents and why some patent 
holders see value in asserting patent rights that no reasonable 
judge or jury would uphold. 
The economic models discussed in this Part confirm 
experiences that are often reported anecdotally by patent 
practitioners. First, alleged infringers often have weak incentives 
to challenge bad patents (even if they are fairly sure they are 
invalid). Second, patent holders have strong incentives to over-
claim their rights. Understanding these phenomena of the 
modern patent system is central to determining which proposed 
reforms are likely to have a differential impact on bad patents. 
Commentators who rely solely on a variation of the CF-model 
may have overlooked the fact that the same structural 
impediments that shield bad patents from litigation also protect 
good patents from litigation. Thus, in spite of the fact that most of 
the reform literature sees lowering the cost of challenging patent 
validity as an unqualified good, we are more neutral. Reforms 
that make all patents easier to challenge will not necessarily have 
a differential impact on bad patents. 
Because the CF-model does not necessarily tell us which 
reforms are likely to have a differential impact on bad patents, we 
developed a second economic model focused on the patent holder’s 
incentives to assert her patent rights. The AF-model indicates 
that where targeting costs are low and the prospect of retaliation 
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is small, a rational patent holder will broadly assert her patent 
even where the probability that any individual target will accept 
a license is low. The AF-model is particularly useful in 
determining which proposed reforms are likely to have a 
differential impact on bad patents. It indicates that exposing 
patent holders to retaliation when they assert their patents has 
the potential to create a differential cost between good patent 
holders and bad patent holders.181 
Part III applies the insights generated by these economic 
models to a wide range of patent-system reforms that are 
currently under consideration. 
PART III.  APPLYING THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT TEST 
Part I of this article explained the need for a clearer 
understanding of bad patents and the need for a differential 
impact test. The purpose of the differential impact test is to 
suggest which reforms to the patent system Congress should 
pursue as a matter of priority. As discussed, applying a test of 
differential impact is necessary because of the empirical 
uncertainty surrounding optimal patent scope and because of the 
apparent need for a more targeted approach to patent reform 
legislation. In Part II of this article we applied two economic 
models to suggest what kinds of changes might have a differential 
impact. In this Part we directly apply the differential impact test 
to a broad survey of patent reform proposals, including those 
embodied in the most recent House and Senate Bills.182 
Congress has recently been invited to consider a wide range 
of solutions for the problems in the patent system.  This sub-
section briefly reviews some of the major reforms under 
consideration. Patent law reform proposals can be divided into 
three main groups: examination reform, substantive doctrinal 
changes, and proposals to reform the structure and procedures of 
patent litigation. In the remainder of this section, these reform 
proposals are evaluated against the differential impact test. 
A. EXAMINATION REFORM 
The first group of reform proposals relates to the Patent 
 181. Further research is required to determine whether this is the basis for a 
true separating equilibrium. 
 182. These bills are no longer live, but their key proposals are likely to be put 
before Congress in a revised form in the near future. 
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Office’s process for examining and ultimately issuing patents.  
One of the widely perceived problems with the patent system is 
that too many suspect patents are issued. A simple solution 
appears to be improving the quality of examination, thus 
removing bad patents at the source. 
Indeed, the Patent Office itself has taken up the cause of 
examination reform. It proposes significant changes, such as 
limiting an applicant’s right to file continuations,183 streamlining 
the examination process by requiring applicants to designate 
representative claims for initial examination,184 launching an 
online peer review pilot project that seeks to ensure that patent 
examiners will have improved access to all available prior art 
during the patent examination process,185  and changing the rules 
relating to Information Disclosure Statements to encourage 
patent applicants to give the Patent Office the most relevant 
information related to their inventions in the early stages of the 
review process.186 
The Patent Office has also recently proposed a new 
“accelerated examination” procedure that would offer a final 
decision on patentability within twelve months to applicants who 
meet restrictive criteria. Under the proposed rules, accelerated 
examination applicants must file electronically, conduct prior art 
searches, submit all prior art that is closest to their invention, 
identify all the limitations in the claims that are disclosed in the 
submitted references (with accurate citations to the references), 
 183. Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued 
Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct 
Claims, Notice of proposed rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. 48, 48 (proposed Jan. 3, 
2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt.1), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/71fr48.pdf.  If recently proposed 
rule changes are adopted, applicants who wish to file any kind of continuation 
application will have to support that filing with “a showing as to why the 
amendment, argument, or evidence presented could not have been previously 
submitted.”  Id. The Patent Office hopes that the proposed change will “improve 
the quality of issued patents, making them easier to evaluate, enforce, and 
litigate” and give “the public a clearer understanding of what is patented.”  Id.; 
see also Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent 
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 96-118 (2004) (discussing elimination or 
limitation of continuation applications). 
 184. Changes to Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent 
Applications, 71 Fed. Reg. 61, 61 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 1), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/71fr61.pdf. 
 185. See Noveck, supra note 71. 
 186. See Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and 
Other Related Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 36323 (July 10, 2006), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/71fr38808.pdf. 
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explain the relationship of the prior art to the invention on a 
claim by claim basis, and limit the patent to three independent 
claims and no more than twenty claims in total.  Accelerated 
examination applicants must also agree to have an interview with 
the patent examiner.187 
To the extent that a reform proposal merely calls for the 
optimization of current resources, we consider it to be neutral in 
terms of our differential impact analysis.188 The harder question 
is whether more resources should be allocated to patent 
examination. The problem with simply throwing more money at 
patent examination is that it is unclear how much additional 
resources will reduce the problem of bad patents. As Mark Lemley 
argues, while improving examination for the small fraction of 
issued patents that are actually asserted would clearly be 
worthwhile, improving examination for the other 95% would 
largely be a waste of resources.189 
Spending more money on patent examination requires having 
more money to spend in the first place. If we assume that we do 
not want to divert the necessary funds away from health, 
education or national security, finding more funds for patent 
examination implies either increasing patent filing fees or simply 
reviewing fewer patents and thus significantly increasing patent 
pendency.  In that event, raising the quality of examination may 
do as much harm to the potential holders of good patents as it 
would to holders of bad patents.  Good and bad patentees are each 
likely to be deterred from filing applications as the cost rises 
and/or the pendency increases.190 We take no position on whether 
raising the quality of patent examination in general is justified, 
but we do observe that it is hard to justify from the perspective of 
the differential impact test.191 
 187. Changes to Practice for Petitions in Patent Applications To Make Special 
and for Accelerated Examination, 71 Fed. Reg. 36323, 36324 (June 26, 2006), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/71fr36323.pdf. 
 188. Reforms such as limiting the applicant’s right to file continuations, 
requiring applicants to designate representative claims for initial examination, 
online peer review and accelerated examination procedures  are within the 
Patent Office’s discretion to implement and do not require legislative action. 
They are thus not the focus of this paper. 
 189. Lemley, supra note 22, at 1511. 
 190. It is possible that increasing the cost of obtaining a patent would have a 
greater chilling effect on bad patents than good ones and thus have a weak 
differential impact. 
 191. It is possible that increasing the cost of obtaining a patent may have a 
weakly differential impact, if a higher quality of examination would give an 
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In addition to changes initiated by the Patent Office, the 
House and Senate Patent Reform Bills both propose three 
significant changes to Patent Office procedure. First, both the 
House and the Senate Bills propose changing the American “first 
inventor” rule to the international standard of “first inventor to 
file.”192  Second, both Bills also provide for pre-grant opposition 
allowing third parties to submit references to the examiner 
during prosecution of a patent application.193  If pre-grant 
opposition is expanded as proposed, third parties who are 
concerned that a piece of relevant prior art has been overlooked 
by the applicant will no longer have to wait for the patent to 
issue. They will be able to submit that prior art six months after 
the patent is first published. Third, the House Bill provides for 
the mandatory publication of patent applications.194  Most patent 
applications are already published after eighteen months under 
the current regime; the significant change contemplated by the 
House Bill is to make publication mandatory.195 
The differential impact analysis we have explored in this 
article is generally supportive of the examination reforms 
proposed under the House and Senate Bills. Adopting the 
international practice of awarding the patent to the first inventor 
to file an application is clearly a long overdue rationalization of 
the current system. One advantage of a first-to- file system is that 
it reduces uncertainty by prompting earlier disclosure of the 
invention to the public.196 A first-to- file system is also 
advantageous because it would harmonize U.S. patent law with 
that of most foreign countries.197 Such harmonization would 
consolidate the ownership of patent rights across national 
boundaries and allow for more streamlined examination 
internationally. Also, it should be recognized that there is no 
significant downside to adopting a first-to-file system because the 
advantage to good patents over bad patents. 
 192. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005); Patent 
Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006). 
 193. Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. § 4 
(2006). 
 194. H.R. 5096 § 3. 
 195. Id. 
 196. But see Kieff, supra note 22, at 96. (arguing that the increased incentive 
to file early in a first to file system may cause inventors to file premature and 
ultimately invalid patent applications). 
 197. 151 CONG. REC. E1160 (daily ed. June 8, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Berman); see also Toshiko Takenaka, The Best Patent Practice or Mere 
Compromise? A Review of the Current Draft of the Substantive Patent Law Treaty 
and a Proposal for a “First-To-Invent” Exception for Domestic Applicants, 11 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 259, 266–71 (2003). 
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first to file is usually judged to be the first to invent as well.198  
Admittedly, adopting a first-to-file system is not likely to have a 
differential impact on bad patents. But given that it reduces cost 
and uncertainty for all patent holders at no cost to the public, we 
endorse this particular reform. 
The second examination reform proposed under the House 
Bill is pre-grant opposition.199  Allowing third parties to submit 
references to the examiner during the prosecution of a patent 
application should improve the quality of decision making for two 
reasons. First, patent examiners will have access to information 
that they may have otherwise overlooked. Second, the fact that a 
third party has submitted prior art signals to the examiner that 
the patent is potentially significant and that she should ensure a 
thorough examination. 
Allowing pre-grant opposition should have a differential 
impact because third parties are likely to target patents that are 
commercially relevant and may be easily invalidated by prior art. 
Pre-grant opposition is likely to filter out some bad patents before 
they are even issued. It should also ensure that the claims of 
patents that are issued are more carefully scrutinized. 
Nonetheless, the overall impact of pre-grant opposition may be 
limited by its reliance the ability of third parties to monitor the 
stream of patent applications as they are published. Furthermore, 
such a system would have to be monitored by the Patent Office to 
ensure that it was not abused to simply delay the issuance of 
valid patents in particular industries. 
The third examination reform proposed under the House Bill 
is mandatory publication of all patent applications after eighteen 
months.200  Until relatively recently, patents filed in the United 
States would remain secret until the day they were issued by the 
Patent Office. This system was advantageous to patent applicants 
because it allowed them to maintain trade secret rights in the 
event that their application was ultimately unsuccessful. In 1999, 
Congress passed the American Inventors Protection Act, which 
required that a patent application be published eighteen months 
 198. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-To-Invent System Has Provided No 
Advantage To Small Entities, 84 J.PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 425, 427 (2002) 
(stating that between 1983 and 2000, the first to file won 1917 of the 2858 
interference cases). 
 199. Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. § 4 
(2006). 
 200. H.R. 5096, § 3. 
SAG M & ROHDE K. Patent Reform and Differential Impact. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2006;8(1):1-
93.  
2007] PATENT REFORM AND DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT 55 
e patent.205 
                                                          
after its earliest filing date.201 However, the significance of that 
reform was undermined by the broad exception for applicants 
who did not file their patent application in any foreign publishing 
country.  Those applicants were allowed to opt out of automatic 
publication.202  The relevant provisions of the House Bill will 
close this loophole and make publication after eighteen months 
the rule for all patent applications.203 Mandatory publication 
would improve the patent system by reducing the possibility that 
third parties are taken by surprise by an issued patent.204 If a 
company is aware that a patent that relates to on their business 
may issue in the near future, it has the option of negotiating a 
license with the applicant or to design around th
Mandatory publication is likely to have a differential impact 
on bad patents because secrecy is probably more helpful to bad 
patent holders than to good ones. Patents made available to the 
public during the examination process are more likely to be 
subject to scrutiny than those that are not. Earlier exposure and 
pre-grant opposition will enable interested third parties to 
supplement the examination of the Patent Office, which should 
lead to fewer potentially bad patents being issued. 
B. DOCTRINAL REFORM 
The FTC, the NAS and large sections of the academic 
community have suggested numerous doctrinal reforms for patent 
law. Some significant proposals include: raising the threshold of 
non-obviousness,206 narrowing the scope of willful 
infringement,207 lowering the burden of proof on patent alleged 
 201. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106–113, § 4502, 
113 Stat. 1501, 1501 (1999) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)). 
 202. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B) (2000). 
 203. H.R. 5096 § 3. 
 204. But see Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 38 (finding that, in some cases 
where an upstream component is patented, royalty overcharges arise even if the 
patent holder approaches the downstream firm before that firm has designed its 
product). 
 205. Id. 
 206. See FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at Executive Summary 10 
(“Recommendation 3: Tighten Certain Legal Standards Used to Evaluate 
Whether A Patent Is ‘Obvious.’”); see also NAS REPORT, supra note 24, at 87 
(suggesting a reinvigoration of the non-obviousness standard). 
 207. See FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at Executive Summary 16 
(“Recommendation 9: Enact Legislation to Require, As a Predicate for Liability 
for Willful Infringement, Either Actual, Written Notice of Infringement from the 
Patentee, or Deliberate Copying of the Patentee’s Invention, Knowing It to Be 
Patented.”); see also NAS REPORT, supra note 24, at 117 (recommending limiting 
the subjective elements of patent litigation). 
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infringers from the daunting “clear and convincing evidence” test 
to a more rational “preponderance of the evidence” test,208 and 
curtailing the availability of injunctions for patent 
infringement.209 
Differential impact analysis has some interesting 
implications for doctrinal reform. What may be most surprising is 
that differential impact analysis is largely unsupportive of reform 
to substantive patent doctrines. Although narrowing the scope of 
willful infringement is clearly advantageous in terms of 
differential impact, reforms such as raising the threshold of non-
obviousness, lowering the burden of proof on patent challengers, 
and curtailing the availability of injunctions for patent 
infringement cannot be recommended on this basis. This does not 
necessarily mean that such reforms are ill-advised, but it does 
imply that they should not be a legislative priority at this time. 
1.  Raising the Threshold of Non-Obviousness 
The meaning and implementation of the non-obviousness 
standard has attracted a great deal of attention in the context of 
bad patents.  It is settled law that a patent should not be granted 
if “the subject matter [of the invention] as a whole would have 
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art.”210  However, several decisions of 
the Federal Circuit have combined to limit the capacity of the 
Patent Office to reject a patent on the grounds of obviousness.211  
For example, the Federal Circuit does not allow a patent 
examiner to reject an application using general knowledge, 
common sense or the examiner’s own understanding or 
experience unless that knowledge is “articulated and placed on 
the record,” 212 a difficult standard to achieve in some cases. This 
 208. See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at Executive Summary 8 
(“Recommendation 2: Enact Legislation to Specify that Challenges to the Validity 
of a Patent Are To Be Determined Based on a ‘Preponderance of the Evidence.’”). 
 209. See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-
Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44. B.C. L. REV. 509, 511 (2003). A 
significant area not addressed here is the scope of the experimental use defense. 
See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does The Public Get?: Experimental 
Use And The Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81 (2004). 
 210. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). 
 211. Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. 
Patent System–Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
989, 999 (2004). 
 212. See, e.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (general 
knowledge); see also In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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requirement is intended to prevent the examiner from indulging 
in hindsight, but it can also tie the hands of the Patent Office 
such that it is unable to “reject something just because it’s 
stupid.”213 
Whether or not the Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit 
should raise the current standards of patentability relating to 
obviousness (or patentable subject matter) is the subject of 
legitimate debate.214  The Supreme Court’s much anticipated 
decision in KSR v. Teleflex is expected to address the question of 
whether a finding of obviousness should require proof of some 
suggestion or motivation to combine prior art references.215  The 
doctrinal arguments in favor of reforming the Federal Circuit’s 
approach may be persuasive. It is difficult, however, to justify the 
reform on the basis of the differential impact test set forth in this 
article because changing the standards of patentability changes 
what constitutes a bad patent.  As a policy analysis tool, 
differential impact only makes sense if we take the existing 
standards of patentability as given.  However, taking a broader 
view, we believe that imposing a more rigorous standard in 
relation to non-obviousness (and patentable subject matter) 
would more closely link patent rights to activity that confers a 
benefit on society. 
2.  Narrowing the Scope of Willful Infringement 
The essential problem with the willful infringement doctrine 
is that it allows a patent holder to carefully craft an “offer to 
license” letter which puts a potential infringer on notice for 
willful infringement but does not expose the patent to judicial 
review. This oddity arises because the Federal Circuit sets a high 
 213. See supra note 1. 
 214. See, e.g., Brief for Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curia in 
Support of Petitioner at 2, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 119 F. App’x 282 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1350) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s current approach to 
non-obviousness is at odds with the statutory language, inconsistent with 
Supreme Court precedent, and contrary to the goals of the patent system).  But 
see Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary Lens: 
The “Suggestion Test” as a Rule of Evidence 2 (Tul. Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 06-03, 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=893965 (finding that the Federal 
Circuit has not narrowed the suggestion test). 
 215. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006).  The Federal 
Circuit had held that a claimed invention cannot be held “obvious,” and thus 
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), in the absence of some proven “'teaching, 
suggestion or motivation' that would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art 
to combine the relevant prior art teachings in the manner claimed.”.  KSR Int’l 
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 119 F. App’x 282, 289-90 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 
S. Ct. 2965 (2006). 
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threshold for standing to seek a declaratory judgment,216 but 
imposes a low threshold for the notice required to trigger willful 
infringement. 217  Before a potential infringer can file a motion for 
declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, she must 
possess a “reasonable apprehension of suit.”218 Federal Circuit 
case law provides that the application of treble damages and 
attorney’s fees is appropriate where an infringer had “actual 
notice of [the plaintiff’s] patent rights” and failed “to exercise due 
care to determine whether or not [she was] infringing” upon those 
rights.219 However, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of “actual 
notice” is so liberal that it can be satisfied by a company’s in-
house engineers or patent attorneys learning of the patent.220 
The steroidal nature of the willful infringement rule has 
three predictable consequences. First, a significant number of 
technology companies direct their personnel not to read 
patents.221 As technology industry representative recently 
 216. See O'Hagins, Inc. v. M5 Steel Mfg., Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1024-25 
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (explaining standards for standing). 
 217. See, e.g., SRI Int'l Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs. Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that actual notice for the purposes of willful 
infringement may be achieved without creating a case of actual controversy in 
terms of the declaratory judgment statute). The defects of the current doctrine of 
willful infringement have been thoroughly reviewed elsewhere. See, e.g., Timothy 
R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 142-45 (2006); 
Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Enhanced Damages and Attorney's 
Fees for Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291 (2004/2005); Mark A. 
Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1087 (2003). 
 218. See O'Hagins, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1024-25.(holding that “actual 
controversy” requires both “(1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee, 
which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory plaintiff 
that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present activity which could 
constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such 
activity.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 219. Underwater Devices Inc., 717 F.2d at 1389-91.  Enhanced damages are 
provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
 220. See Note, The Disclosure Function Of The Patent System (Or Lack 
Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007 (2005) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s 
development of the doctrine of willful infringement undermines the disclosure 
function of the patent system by deterring innovators from reading patents to 
protect themselves from treble damage awards in infringement suits); see also 
Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1414-16 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
 221. Transcript of Federal Trade Commission Public Hearing on Competition 
and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy at 
420–21 (Feb. 27, 2002) (statement of R. Jordan Greenhall), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020227trans.pdf;  see also Timothy Holbrook, 
Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 144 (2006) (discussing various 
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commented: 
[T]he penalty for so-called willful infringement makes [searching 
patents] a really stupid idea . . . there’s a penalty applied to it if you find 
patents that later on somebody says you infringe. You can be fined, you 
can be liable for triple damages.222 
Second, when they cannot avoid learning about the existence 
of a patent, many companies will obtain non-infringement 
opinions in order to demonstrate their exercise of due care in 
avoiding infringement.223 Third, some alleged infringers settle 
cases they might otherwise pursue because of fear of attorneys 
fees and treble damages. 
The possibility of willful infringement increases the penalties 
for unsuccessfully challenging an assertion of patent rights. 
Furthermore, the zone of immunity between vague assertion and 
actions which create a reasonable apprehension of suit 
encourages patent owners to broadly and indiscriminately assert 
their rights. In effect, patent holders who provide “notice” of their 
rights that falls short of the declaratory judgment standard get 
something for nothing – the patent holder raises the alleged 
infringer’s expected cost of challenging the patent without 
increasing her own expected cost of retaliation. To quote one 
general counsel: 
We worry about these letters because of things like the willfulness 
standard. It would be great if I could just say this is ridiculous and 
throw it in the trash can. We obviously can’t do that. We engaged in a 
very reasoned analysis and, in some cases, we get very expensive 
opinions of counsel which, in some cases, sit on the shelf because you 
never hear again. In fact, most of the time you never hear again, but 
that does not mean it is free to me. We also get a lot of what I call 
“squirrelly” letters [which say] “We noticed that you recently announced 
your such and such feature. We think that you might be interested or 
benefited from taking a license to our portfolio.” So are they accusing me 
of something? Well, I do not know the answer to that, but I can 
guarantee you if there is litigation, they are going to say they did, and I 
disincentives to read patents and patent applications). 
 222. Transcript of Federal Trade Commission Public Hearing on Competition 
and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy at 
677 (Feb. 28, 2002) (statement of Robert Barr), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020228ftc.pdf. 
 223. See, e.g., Transcript of Federal Trade Commission Public Hearing on 
Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based 
Economy at 155 (Oct. 25, 2002) (statement of John R. Thomas), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/021025trans.pdf (“First, we've heard that it 
supposedly incents opinion of counsel to guide accused infringers, but in fact, it's 
pretty commonly known in the patent bar that most of the opinions produced by 
counsel are commonly known as non-infringement and invalidity opinions 
because that's inevitably the advice that they give.”). 
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am going to be dealing with that issue in litigation.224 
 
The House Bill will have a differential impact on bad patents 
by aligning the standards for willfulness and standing for 
declaratory judgment. The House Bill eliminates the willfulness 
zone and reduces the incentives for patent holders to make 
indiscriminate “offers to license” by narrowing the application of 
willful infringement. The House Bill narrows the permitted 
grounds for finding willful infringement to cases where the patent 
owner presents clear and convincing evidence of one of two 
things. First, that the infringer either intentionally copied the 
patented invention with knowledge that it was patented;225 or 
second, that the infringer received written notice from the 
patentee alleging acts of infringement in a manner sufficient to 
give the infringer an objectively reasonable apprehension of suit 
on such patent.226 The proposed legislation also restricts when a 
patent holder can plead willful infringement such that no 
determination of willfulness can be made before issues of validity 
and infringement are determined by the court.227 Eliminating the 
willfulness zone will have a differential impact because patent 
holders will no longer be able to raise the stakes for alleged 
infringers without increasing their own exposure to retaliation. 
This has a differential impact because bad patents are more likely 
to be invalidated on declaratory judgment. 
3. Eliminating the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard 
The Federal Circuit has interpreted the Patent Act’s 
presumption of validity for issued patents to mean that a 
potential infringer seeking to invalidate a patent must prove by 
“clear and convincing evidence” that the patent is invalid.228 This 
 224. Edited and Excerpted Transcript of the Symposium on Ideas into Action: 
Implementing Reform of the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1053, 1128–
29 (2003). 
 225. Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. § 6 
(2006) (proposing to amend 35 U.S.C. 284).  The House Bill also provides that 
damages for willful infringement may be awarded against a party if, “after 
having been found by a court to have infringed that patent, the infringer engaged 
in conduct that was not colorably different from the conduct previously found to 
have infringed the patent, and which resulted in a separate finding of 
infringement of the same patent.”  Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id.  Also note that the court’s determination of an infringer’s willfulness 
shall be made without a jury. 
 228. See, e.g., Kegel Co. Inc. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1429 (Fed. 
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heightened burden of proof for those wishing to challenge a 
patent’s validity is intended to safeguard patent holders from 
frivolous and unsubstantiated attacks. However, the application 
of this high evidentiary threshold is difficult to reconcile with the 
realities of modern patent examination.229 We do not know what 
proportion of patents are wrongly issued by the Patent Office, but 
we do know that roughly half of all litigated patents turn out to 
be invalid.230 As such, the clear and convincing evidence standard 
is frequently considered a prime candidate for revision.231 
Although we concede that the clear and convincing evidence 
of invalidity may have outlived its usefulness, we do not 
recommend simply changing to the more common preponderance 
of the evidence test. Lowering the standard of proof required to 
challenge patent validity will not necessarily have a significantly 
differential impact on bad patents; instead, it is more likely to 
decrease the value of all patents, regardless of whether they are 
good or bad. Arguably, lowering the burden of proof with respect 
to invalidity may have a weakly differential impact – that is, one 
that would devalue both good and bad patents but have a greater 
effect on bad ones. Even if this is the case, it does not provide a 
strong basis for doctrinal reform. Lowering the burden of proof for 
challenging the validity of a patent would certainly decrease the 
potential extortion of bad patents, but it would also devalue the 
patent portfolios of every good patent holder by making them 
more easily subject to unwarranted challenges. In Part IV of this 
article we propose a variable presumption of validity as an 
alternative to changing the standard. This would have a 
significantly differential impact.232 
4. Curtailing the Availability of Injunctions for Patent 
Infringement 
In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, the Supreme Court rejected 
Cir. 1997) (“Invalidity must be established by facts supported by clear and 
convincing evidence”). 
 229. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 22, at 1528. The presumption of validity has 
little if any basis in fact. Examiners do not in fact spend long hours poring over a 
patent application or the prior art. They spend very little time, and far less than 
either the lawyers or the triers of fact in infringement cases. They regularly miss 
the most relevant prior art. Id., see also Mark A. Lemley et al., What to do About 
Bad Patents, 28 REGULATION 10 (2005-06), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=869826. 
 230. Allison & Lemley, supra note 49, at 205 (stating only 54% of the patents 
were found valid in a population of 300 final validity decisions). 
 231. See FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at Executive Summary 8. 
 232. See infra Part IV. 
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the Federal Circuit’s automatic imposition of an injunction for 
patent infringement and held that “according to well-established 
principles of equity,  a plaintiff [must] satisfy a four-factor test 
before a court may grant relief [in the form of a permanent 
injunction].”233 To obtain a permanent injunction a plaintiff must 
demonstrate: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available 
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for 
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that 
the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.234 
If passed, the House Bill will slightly amplify the effect of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay. The House Bill reaffirms the 
equitable nature of injunctions and requires judges to act “in 
accordance with the principles of equity” and to apply injunctions 
on such terms as they deem fair.235  Significantly, the House Bill 
provides for an automatic stay of any injunction pending appeal if 
the defendant is able to show that “the stay would not result in 
irreparable harm to the owner of the patent and that the balance 
of hardships from the stay does not favor the owner of the 
patent.”236 
The arguments for and against granting injunctions in favor 
of non-practicing entities have been covered extensively in the 
legal literature and before the Supreme Court in its consideration 
of the eBay case.237 In terms of the differential impact test, it 
should be noted that the ability to obtain a final injunction adds 
significant negotiating leverage to good and bad patents alike. 
There may well be good reasons to relax the Federal Circuit’s 
inflexible stance toward final injunctions, but this particular 
reform is not a high priority in terms of differential impact.238 
 233. eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1839. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. § 8 
(2006) (proposing to amend 35 U.S.C. 283). The fairness language does not 
appear in the rival Senate Bill. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in 
Support of Petitioners, eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 
05-130); Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent, eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) 
(No. 05-130). 
 238. Arguably making it more difficult to obtain preliminary injunctions may 
have a differential impact on bad patents. 
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C.  LITIGATION REFORM 
In addition to changes to Patent Office procedure and 
substantive patent doctrines discussed above, Congress is also 
being asked to consider major changes to the entire structure 
through which patent disputes are litigated. Again, there is a 
considerable array of reform proposals on the table ranging from 
providing incentives for third party patent bounty hunters, 
facilitating collective action by alleged infringers, to creating an 
administrative review system for determining patent validity as 
an alternative to district court litigation. 
As discussed in Part II, the CF-model shows that the high 
cost of patent litigation insulates bad patents from effective 
challenge in many cases. The AF-model shows the patent holder’s 
decision to assert is directly tied to the probability that their 
targets will retaliate and the potential harm that retaliation 
might cause. Both models indicate that changes to the structure 
of patent litigation have significant potential to affect the 
behavior of patent holders and potential infringers.  The question 
we address in this section is the extent to which the litigation 
reform proposals currently being debated are likely to have a 
differential impact on bad patents. 
1.  Fee-Shifting and Bounty Hunter Proposals 
The three bounty/fee-shifting proposals reviewed below 
illustrate the diversity of recommendations on the Congressional 
table. For example, John Thomas proposes encouraging third 
parties to assist the Patent Office in its search for invalidating 
prior art by rewarding them with a bounty for any relevant prior 
art that reads on the purported invention.239  Under the Thomas 
proposal, the Patent Office would publish the patent application 
and invite the public to submit prior art before the patent is 
issued.240  If application claims are rejected based on these third 
party submissions of prior art, the submitting party would receive 
a bounty determined by the Patent Office and paid by the 
applicant.241  As an alternative, Joseph Miller advocates a 
litigation stage bounty.242  Miller suggests that third parties 
 239. John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A 
Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 342 (2001). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Miller, supra note 22. Miller argues that the Thomas proposal occurs too 
early in the process and that third parties would be unable to determine whether 
the technology represented in the application is commercially valuable. See id. at 
704. 
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should receive a bounty in situations where the “court voids a 
patent claim on a ground that the patentee could have prevented 
by diligently and candidly researching, drafting, and prosecuting 
its patent application.”243 
Jay Kesan offers a related, but distinct proposal. Kesan 
proposes a one-way, pro-defendant, fee-shifting system in which 
the patent holder pays the costs of litigation if at least some of the 
patent claims are invalidated on the basis of prior art which was 
reasonably discoverable by the patentee during prosecution.244 
Ordinarily a patent holder has very little incentive to diligently 
research the prior art or to submit only those claims that are 
likely to survive litigation stage review.  However, punishing the 
patent holder in those cases where reasonable and diligent 
research would have suggested that the patent claims were 
invalid changes the patent holder’s incentives at the time of 
prosecution. Patent holders who choose not to conduct thorough 
prior art searches either during prosecution or before attempting 
to enforce their patents would expose themselves to increased 
litigation costs if their claims prove to be invalid. 245 
The fee-shifting and bounty hunter proposals outlined above 
effectively raise the alleged infringer’s expected gains from 
challenging a patent, or, alternatively, lower the patent holder’s 
expected gains from asserting her patent. The bounty hunter 
proposals are effectively penalties for improvident patent 
drafting, whereas Kesan’s fee-shifting proposal constitutes a 
penalty for asserting an improvidently drafted patent. Both 
measures may have a differential impact because bad patents 
have a higher average probability of triggering these costs. 
However, there is a risk that the fee-shifting and bounty 
hunter proposals might be too aggressive in their attempt to 
enhance the incentives to challenge patents. Penalizing 
improvident patent drafting should stimulate patent holders to 
improve patent quality at the application stage, but the resulting 
increased expenditure is not necessarily efficient given that the 
commercial value of the innovation will often be unknown at the 
 243. Id. at 707.  Miller’s bounty system would thus incorporate challenges to 
best mode, enablement, and possibly inequitable conduct by the patent applicant 
before the PTO.  Miller would seek to overcome the problems he identifies in the 
Thomas proposal by tying the amount of the bounty awarded to the patent 
holder’s past profits. This would provide incentives to challenge only those 
patents likely to be commercially valuable. Id. at 711-12. 
 244. Kesan,  supra note 22, at 787, 795. 
 245. Id. at 795. 
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time of drafting. If these penalties are reserved for those patent 
holders who fail to look for and disclose even the most readily 
available prior art, then they should not trouble good patent 
holders too much.  But, if such penalties are more broadly 
applied, they may substantially raise the legal costs of all patent 
prosecution in a way that discriminates more in relation to the 
budget constraints of the patentee than the quality of their 
patents. Indeed, reforms centered on bounties and fee shifting 
may simply create disparities according to patent holder risk 
tolerance as opposed to their identity as either good or bad patent 
holders.246 
Furthermore, larger companies are unlikely to view the 
bounty payoff as a significant revenue stream. Therefore, their 
incentives to challenge patents will remain unchanged with 
respect to the current system. Smaller niche firms may form 
solely for the purposes of submitting prior art in anticipation of 
bounty payouts. This would be mitigated by the requirement of 
submission fees, but still leaves open the possibility of continuing 
patent attacks by non-interested parties based solely on financial 
reward incentives.  Such a scenario inevitably leads to a low-
quality of third party prior art submissions and thus an increase 
of costs across the board for all patent prosecution. 
Jay Kesan’s fee-shifting proposal is more promising than the 
bounty hunter proposals in terms of its differential impact. 
Ordinarily, a patent holder has very little incentive to diligently 
research the prior art or to submit only those claims that are 
likely to survive litigation stage review.  Fee-shifting would 
attack this problem by effectively punishing the patent holder in 
those cases where reasonable and diligent research would have 
suggested that the patent claims were invalid. 
Fee-shifting should have two significant effects. First, the 
prospect of fee-shifting changes the patent holder’s incentives at 
the time of prosecution. The risk of suffering an adverse award of 
costs should make at least some patent applicants consider 
performing a more thorough prior art search during prosecution 
and/or before attempting to enforce the patent.247 Second, the 
prospect of fee-shifting should also reduce the incentives of 
potential infringers to settle strong invalidation cases early. 
Fee-shifting appears to have a differential impact because 
although all patent holders face slightly greater risks when they 
 246. Id. at 796 (acknowledging that fee shifting imposes a heavier burden on 
poor companies which may not be able to bear the increased costs of prosecution 
or pre-litigation search actions). 
 247. Id. at 795. 
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attempt to enforce their patents, the magnitude of those risks is 
tied to the quality of the underlying patent. However, it should be 
noted that its actual effects in the patent context are somewhat 
speculative. A study of the effect of fee-shifting in Florida medical 
malpractice cases indicates that fee-shifting both encourages 
those with strong cases to pursue their claims while discouraging 
those with weak cases.248 If this also held true for patent 
litigation it would mean that fee-shifting would have a clearly 
differential impact on bad patents. However, there are at least 
two caveats about fee-shifting. First, there is surprisingly little 
agreement among theoreticians as to the effect of fee-shifting on 
litigation in general.249 Second, the few empirical studies that 
have been performed on the effect of fee-shifting have not been in 
the area of patent law. It is conceivable that a study involving 
Florida medical malpractice litigation may have entirely different 
idiosyncrasies than studies of federal patent litigation.250 
The Senate Bill appears to have embraced the idea of fee-
shifting, albeit not in the form suggested by Kesan. Section 5 of 
the Senate Bill requires courts to award attorneys’ fees to a 
prevailing party in cases where the non-prevailing party’s legal 
position was not “substantially justified.”251  The Senate Bill 
departs from Kesan’s proposal in two ways. First, Kesan proposes 
a pro-defendant one-way fee-shifting scheme, whereas the fee-
shifting rule proposed in the Senate Bill would apply to either the 
patent owner or the alleged infringer. Second, the Senate Bill’s 
threshold of lack of substantial justification means that the 
provision is less likely to be invoked than Kesan’s standard of 
undisclosed prior art being reasonably discoverable by the 
patentee during prosecution.252 
Although there are reasons to hope that fee-shifting will have 
a differential impact on bad patents, fee-shifting alone is not a 
complete solution. First, fee-shifting does nothing to address the 
 248. Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: 
What does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 1943, 1949-50 
(2002). 
 249. Id. at 1947–48 (“scholars have considered the impact of fee shifting on . . 
. [with] surprisingly little agreement”). 
 250. Id. at 1950 (Kritzer summarizes the findings of a study of the effect of 
fee-shifting in Florida medical malpractice cases as follows: fee-shifting 
“encourages some plaintiffs (those with strong cases) to pursue their claims while 
discouraging others (those with weak cases). The result is to reduce the frequency 
of low-merit claims.”). 
 251. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006). 
 252. Kesan, supra note 22, at 787, 795. 
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issue of delay in federal court litigation. Second, fee-shifting is 
only effective if patent holders have the resources to pay an 
award of costs. Finally, the prospect of fee-shifting may have a 
chilling effect on the assertion of good patents held by risk-averse 
entities. 
2. Facilitating Collective Action 
Carl Shapiro has suggested that one solution to the problem 
of bad patents is to make it easier for government agencies with 
an interest in consumer welfare such as the FTC, or public 
interest advocacy groups such as The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and the Public Patent Foundation to challenge the 
validity of suspect patents.253 Shapiro further suggests that the 
antitrust authorities should make it easier for potential infringers 
to collectively defend their rights by “making it clear that 
cooperative efforts to challenge patents will generally not be 
considered illegal collusion, even when such efforts involve 
horizontal rivals who are seeking to pay less for a technological 
input, or license.”254 
Edward Hsieh proposes facilitating cooperation among 
alleged infringers by allowing for the mandatory joinder of all 
potential defendants and thus consolidating all defendants in a 
single action. He argues that mandatory joinder would lower the 
individual defendant’s costs of litigation, reduce overall litigation 
costs, prevent patentees from suing smaller companies first, and 
encourage defendants to challenge bad patents.255 
Cooperative patent challenges and mandatory joinder are 
both aimed at solving collective action problems relating to patent 
litigation. The difference between the two proposals is that the 
first merely facilitates collective defense by potential infringers, 
the second is actually coercive. From the perspective of 
differential impact, the problem with facilitating collective action 
is that there is nothing to suggest that potential infringers will 
act collusively to defeat bad patents more than they will act 
collusively to defeat good patents. 
 253. See Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and 
Critique, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1040–41 (2004); see also, Lemley & 
Shapiro, supra note 89. 
 254. Shapiro, supra note 253, at 1041. 
 255. Hsieh, supra note 89.  
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3. Post-Grant Review 
The FTC, the NAS and a wide array of commentators have 
urged Congress to authorize the Patent Office to administer a 
system of post-grant review of patent validity (post-grant 
review).256 Post-grant review would supplement the current third 
party and inter-partes reexamination systems, which are rarely 
used because of their prejudicial estoppel effects.257 The Patent 
Act provides that any issue raised by a challenger during 
reexamination cannot be revisited in a later trial involving that 
challenger.258 This means that any potential infringer who tries 
to invalidate a patent through reexamination must be willing to 
risk that the Patent Office will decide in its favor. The challenger 
has no opportunity to litigate any argument or prior art evidence 
used in reexamination should the Patent Office make a mistake. 
This estoppel effect makes reexamination extremely risky unless 
a potential infringer is already engaged in federal court 
litigation.259 
According to its proponents, post-grant review would 
drastically reduce the cost of challenging bad patents and 
therefore help private parties fill the gaps left by an incomplete 
examination process.  In the words of Rep. Lamar Smith, a 
system of post-grant review will “provide meaningful, low-cost 
alternatives to litigation for challenging the patent validity.”260  
Senator Orrin Hatch explains the need for post-grant review as 
follows: 
[B]y adopting a more robust post-grant review proceeding we are 
providing a more efficient means of challenging a patent’s validity in an 
administrative proceeding.  This is necessary to address systemic 
problems in our patent system, making post-grant review an essential 
component of any meaningful reform legislation.  While there appears to 
be substantial agreement regarding the need for a more meaningful 
post-issuance review, there are strong disagreements over its specific 
attributes and scope.261 
 256. See FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 7 (Recommendation 1); NAS REPORT, 
supra note 24, at 95 (Recommendation 3); see also Patents Depend on Quality Act 
of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006); S. 3818 § 6. 
 257. Farrell & Merges, supra note 22, at 966 (citing only 392 ex parte 
reexamination requests in 2003). 
 258. 35 U.S.C. § 317 (2000). 
 259. Farrell & Merges, supra note 22, at 967 (noting that the broad consensus 
among patent experts is that the risks of reexamination are too great). 
 260. 151 CONG. REC. E1160 (daily ed. June 8, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Smith). 
 261. 152 CONG. REC. S8804-01, S8830 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2006) (statement of 
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Post-grant review of issued patents has enormous potential 
to discourage and devalue bad patents without undermining the 
value of good patents in three ways: (i) post-grant review will 
provide a low cost method of challenging patents and thus 
prevent bad patent holders from hiding behind the high cost of 
federal court litigation; (ii) post-grant review will increase the 
expected cost of retaliation for asserting a bad patent without 
(significantly) increasing the expected cost of retaliation for 
asserting a good patent; and (iii) post-grant review will reduce 
uncertainty and information asymmetries relating to patent 
quality. 
First, by reducing the cost of challenging the validity of an 
issued patent in some cases, post-grant review will make it more 
difficult for bad patent holders to simply rely on the high cost of 
federal court litigation to insulate them from challenges. Recall 
that the main implication of the CF-model was that the higher 
litigation costs rise, the less likely an alleged infringer will be to 
challenge the validity of a patent. The CF-model also 
demonstrated that in a large number of cases, having a high 
probability of successfully challenging a patent was not enough to 
ensure that the challenge would in fact be made. When the cost of 
successful litigation is more than the cost of licensing, it does not 
appear to make sense to challenge a patent, no matter how sure 
one is that such a challenge would be successful.262 Post-grant 
review is significant in this context because it lowers the 
minimum threshold of litigation from hundreds of thousands of 
dollars to merely tens of thousands of dollars. 
A high minimum threshold of litigation gives bad patent 
holders the flexibility to demand licensing fees from multiple 
alleged infringers that are considerable but would not make it 
worthwhile for any one alleged infringer to challenge the patent. 
For example, a patent holder can usually demand $50,000 from 
twenty different alleged infringers and be fairly certain that none 
will challenge the patent’s validity in court. However, if post-
grant review allows a potential infringer to challenge the validity 
of the patent for a mere $25,000,263 the patent holder can expect 
to encounter serious opposition from potential infringers who 
Sen. Hatch). 
 262. Admittedly, some potential infringers may challenge in such a situation 
if they have a strong reputation interest in not being seen to be an easy target.  
Nonetheless, the simplified parameters of the CF-model probably capture the 
behavior of a majority of firms. 
 263. This is merely an example; the actual costs of post-grant review are hard 
to estimate at this point.  
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believe that the patent has obvious defects. In theory, the holder 
of a bad patent could still attempt to play the same game under a 
post-grant review regime, but that would require demanding 
almost negligible royalty rates. Licensing demands that are 
pitched too low will immediately signal to potential infringers 
that the patent holder has very little confidence in her ability to 
enforce the patent. 
Second, post-grant review will have a differential impact on 
bad patents by increasing the expected cost of retaliation for 
asserting a bad patent without increasing the expected cost of 
retaliation for asserting a good patent, or at least without 
increasing it significantly. The AF-model discussed earlier 
indicates that increasing the expected cost of retaliation reduces 
the patent holder’s incentive to assert her patent.264  It follows 
that increasing the expected cost of retaliation for bad patents 
without significantly increasing the expected cost of retaliation 
for good patents will reduce the assertion of bad patents relative 
to good ones. By substantially reducing the monetary cost of 
challenging a patent’s validity, post-grant review will expose all 
patent holders to an increased threat of retaliation when they 
assert their patent rights.  However, post-grant review still has a 
differential impact because the expected cost of that retaliation 
should be much lower for good patents than for bad ones. 
Post-grant review has a more significant differential impact 
than would be achieved by simply lowering the cost of federal 
court litigation. Post-grant review is different from federal court 
litigation for two reasons. The first is that the high cost and delay 
of full scale patent litigation is a significant detriment to both 
good and bad patent holders alike. The second is that good patent 
holders continue to face a significant chance of losing in federal 
court because of the uncertainties of litigation generally, the risk 
of judicial error and fluctuations in patent law doctrine.265 Figure 
2 illustrates this point using the same sliding scale of patent 
validity as in Figure 1.266  Just as in Figure 1, the closer a patent 
is to the left hand side of the scale, the more likely it is to be 
upheld (or found to be infringed) by a court. Figure 2 depicts four 
patents; Patent A has a 95% chance of being found to be valid, 
Patent B has 60% chance, Patent C has a 50% chance and Patent 
D has a 5% chance. 
 264. See supra Part II.E. 
 265. See supra Part II.D. 
 266. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
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FIGURE 2(a): PATENTS AT RISK IF LITIGATED 
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FIGURE 2(b): PATENTS AT RISK UNDER POST-GRANT REVIEW 
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As Figure 2(a) illustrates, although Patent D is far more 
likely to be invalidated through litigation, Patents B and C are 
also at risk. In contrast, as depicted in Figure 2(b), the narrower 
scope of post-grant review should only place Patent D in jeopardy. 
Good patent holders should only face a very slight risk from post-
grant review if post-grant review is only intended to filter out 
patents that clearly fail to satisfy the statutory grounds of 
patentability. Post-grant review, generally, will not be a viable 
method for determining the validity of Patents B and C because 
the information required to make such fine-grained 
determinations will typically not be available at such an early 
stage. In addition, as discussed in more detail below, the expected 
cost of retaliation in the form of post-grant review should be much 
lower for good patents than for bad ones because good patents 
actually benefit from being subjected to the review process. 
Finally, post-grant review will have a differential impact on 
bad patents by reducing uncertainty and information 
asymmetries relating to patent quality. As discussed in relation 
to the CF-model, would-be patent challengers face significant 
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Our main conclusions with respect to the differential impact 
potential for the reforms analyzed in this article are as follows. In 
applying the differential impact test to the multitude of 
examination reforms that have been suggested, we noted that 
information costs in assessing patent quality. When a firm first 
receives some notification that it may be infringing another 
person’s patent rights, it needs to form a view as to both the 
merits of that allegation and the likelihood that the patent holder 
will pursue it. Obtaining this information is costly because bad 
patent holders will go as far as possible to imitate good patent 
holders in terms of the royalties they demand and their apparent 
willingness to go to court. Consequently, uncertainty and 
information asymmetries relating to patent quality have a 
leveling out effect; they increase the targets’ willingness to accept 
a license from bad patent holders and reduce their willingness to 
accept a license from good patent holders. 
Post-grant review ameliorates this problem by providing a 
more credible signal of patent quality.  Patents that survive post-
grant review are more likely to be taken seriously in the market 
than ones that have never been tested. If post-grant review 
functions as intended, it will not only expose patents that should 
never have been granted, it will also signal the merits of patents 
that are reviewed and not found invalid. Not only does post-grant 
review provide a way to screen out some bad patents, it also 
provides credible information to the market about good patents.  
In this way, post-grant review provides a signal of patent quality 
for good patents that bad patent holders face great costs in 
imitating. Furthermore, if the model for post-grant review we 
propose in Part IV of this article is adopted, patents that survive 
post-grant review will not only appear stronger, they will be 
entitled to a stronger presumption of validity in litigation. 
D.  ASSESSING PATENT REFORM ON THE BASIS OF DIFFERENTIAL 
IMPACT 
The purpose of this section was to directly apply the 
differential impact test to a broad survey of current patent reform 
proposals, including those embodied in the latest version of the 
House Bill and the Senate Bill. Before summarizing our 
conclusions, it is important to stress that we are not suggesting 
that reforms that are unlikely to have a differential impact on 
bad patents are necessarily ill-conceived, rather, we are simply 
arguing that such reforms should not be a legislative priority at 
this time. 
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proposals which simply call for the optimization of current 
resources should be considered to be neutral in terms of 
differential impact. In contrast, devoting additional resources to 
patent examination is unlikely to have a differential impact on 
bad patents that would justify the additional expenditure.  We 
did conclude, however, that the three examination reforms 
proposed under the House Bill, first-to-file, pre-grant opposition 
and mandatory publication of all patent applications after 
eighteen months, are all justified under a differential impact 
analysis.267 
Doctrinal reforms generally did not fare well when assessed 
against the differential impact standard. Of the four main areas 
of doctrinal reform reviewed, only narrowing the scope of willful 
infringement is strongly recommended under a differential 
impact analysis. 
Post-grant review and other changes to the structure of 
patent litigation have significant potential to create a differential 
impact on bad patents. Specifically, we concluded that fee-shifting 
may encourage good patent holders to pursue their cases while 
simultaneously discouraging bad patent holders. Proposals 
relating to bounties and cooperative patent challenges did not 
appear to be justified in terms of differential impact. Of all the 
reforms surveyed, establishing a forum for the post-grant review 
of issued patents has the most potential to discourage and 
devalue bad patents without undermining the value of good 
patents. Post-grant review has three key advantages in this 
respect: (i) it will provide a low cost method of challenging patents 
and thus prevent bad patent holders from hiding behind the high 
cost of federal court litigation; (ii) it will increase the expected 
cost of retaliation for asserting a bad patent without significantly 
increasing the expected cost of retaliation for asserting a good 
patent; and (iii) it will reduce uncertainty and information 
asymmetries relating to patent quality. 
PART IV. MULTISTAGE POST-GRANT REVIEW 
Under the differential impact test elaborated in this article, 
we have proposed that the current legislative push in relation to 
patent reform should specifically address problems related to bad 
patents. To reiterate, Congress should defer consideration of 
reforms that attempt to either strengthen or weaken the 
exclusive rights of patent holders generally in favor of reforms 
 267. Although note that our reasoning with respect to the first-to-file 
recommendation is slightly different. 
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that are likely to raise the costs of obtaining or enforcing bad 
patents significantly more than they raise the costs of obtaining 
or enforcing good patents. 
As discussed in the previous Part, the differential impact test 
supports the adoption of some type of post-grant review 
system.268  In this Part we explain how the differential impact 
test not only supports the idea of post-grant review in general, 
but also can be applied to build a better model for post-grant 
review than those currently on the table. In short, looking at post-
grant review through the lens of differential impact leads us to 
propose a very different kind of system from those embodied in 
the House Bill, the Senate Bill or those proposed by the FTC, the 
NAS and various other commentator
There are three key differences between our proposal and 
other variations of post-grant review. First, we propose the 
adoption of a variable presumption of validity such that: (i) issued 
patents would only receive a weak presumption of validity (i.e. 
they would not be subject to the clear and convincing evidence 
standard); (ii) patents that have been unsuccessfully challenged 
in post-grant review would be entitled to a strong presumption of 
validity (including the clear and convincing evidence standard); 
and (iii) rather than automatically invalidating a patent that is 
successfully challenged in post-grant review, such patents would 
merely be weakened by attaching a presumption of invalidity. 
Second, we propose a multiple stage system of post-grant 
review, (“MPGR”) with two distinct stages in order to balance the 
goal of greater scrutiny for bad patents with the need to minimize 
potential harassment of good patents. The main benefit of post-
grant review should be that it allows potential infringers a low 
cost opportunity to correct what they believe to be obvious errors 
by the Patent Office.  However, if that opportunity is made too 
freely available, it may be overused by well resourced potential 
infringers to chill the assertion of good patents.  Finding the right 
balance between lowering the cost of challenging bad patents and 
preventing harassment of good patents can be achieved by using 
multiple stages of review under the MPGR process. 
Third, we propose bringing questions of claim construction 
into post-grant review so that both sides of the bad patent 
phenomenon can be addressed.  Patents that should never have 
been issued receive most of the attention in the bad patent 
debate, however the hyper-assertion of vaguely worded claims 
 268. See supra Part III.D. 
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has at least as much potential to damage the incentive function of 
the patent system.269  To meaningfully address the bad patent 
phenomenon, post-grant review must find a way to deal with 
patents that may be legitimate in one sense but are illegitimately 
asserted beyond their natural scope. 
A. A VARIABLE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY 
Differential impact analysis indicates that calls for the 
abolition of the clear and convincing evidence standard may be 
misconceived.270 While it is true that the application of the clear 
and convincing evidence standard in relation to patent validity is 
difficult to reconcile with the realities of modern patent 
examination, it does not seem likely that lowering the standard of 
proof required to challenge patent validity will have a differential 
impact on bad patents.  The main reason for this is that the 
presumption of validity and the clear and convincing evidence 
standard together provide significant protection against 
adjudicative error for good patents as well as bad ones. 
However, none of the arguments in favor of retaining the 
strong form of the presumption of validity (i.e. presumption of 
validity plus convincing evidence standard) require that all 
patents should be subject to the one evidentiary standard.  As an 
alternative to simply keeping or abolishing the strong form of the 
presumption of validity, we propose the application of a variable 
presumption of validity tied to post-grant review.271 
Under the current system an applicant can obtain a patent 
without definitively proving anything at the Patent Office.  
Nonetheless, once that patent issues, it can only be invalidated 
through clear and convincing evidence.272 Post-grant review 
 269. In Part I we explained that the term “bad patent” should be reserved for 
patents that are asserted to cover a product or activity that no reasonable fact 
finder could find it covered. See supra Part I.B. 
 270. See supra Part III.B. 
 271. Mark Lemley and his coauthors have also proposed a variable 
presumption of validity in a slightly different context. Their proposal is that 
“applicants should be allowed to ‘gold-plate’ their patents by paying for the kind 
of searching review that would merit a strong presumption of validity” but 
otherwise a weaker form of the presumption of validity should apply.  Lemley et 
al., supra note 229, at 12.  Although this may sound like a radical shift from 
current practice, it must be noted that current reexamination procedures allow 
the presumption of validity to be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence 
and can result in the cancellation of the patent. Consolidated Patent Rules, 37 
C.F.R. § 1.555 (2007). Note also, that in some pre-Federal Circuit cases, the 
presumption of validity was eliminated if the prior art in court was not before the 
Patent Office. 
 272. See, e.g., Kegel Company, Inc. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1429 
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provides us with an excellent opportunity to revisit the one-size-
fits-all application of the presumption of validity with something 
that is both more rational and more nuanced. 
The presumption of invalidity means that a patent that is 
successfully challenged would still be valid in a technical sense 
but that if the patent holder wished to enforce it against a 
potential infringer she would face an uphill battle in court.  The 
presumption of invalidity quite literally means that the patent is 
presumed to be invalid as an evidentiary matter, but that if the 
patent holder can show, on the preponderance of the evidence, 
that their patent is valid and infringed, she is entitled to enforce 
her rights.  In that case, the patent would then be entitled to the 
strong presumption of validity. 
We propose that issued patents should generally only be 
entitled to a weak presumption of validity: i.e. they should be 
presumed valid, but could be invalidated by a preponderance of 
the evidence rather than the onerous clear and convincing 
evidence standard. Once a patent has been challenged in post-
grant review and is upheld, it should then be entitled to a 
stronger presumption of validity. Treating reviewed and un-
reviewed patents differently is consistent with the differential 
impact approach because patents that have been unsuccessfully 
challenged via post-grant review (or litigation) are less likely to 
be bad patents.  We cannot be certain that an unsuccessfully 
challenged patent will not later be shown to be invalid, but we 
can be relatively confident that such invalidation will not be 
easily achieved. 
We further propose that rather than automatically 
invalidating a patent that is successfully challenged in post-grant 
review, such patents should merely be weakened by attaching a 
presumption of invalidity. This is a significant departure from the 
current reexamination system and from the post-grant review 
proposals presently before Congress.  By lowering the stakes of 
post-grant review, the presumption of invalidity makes the lack of 
appeal rights and other procedural safeguards with respect to 
post-grant review more palatable.273 
One of the advantages of merely applying a presumption of 
invalidity to a patent that is discredited in post-grant review is 
that it facilitates a streamlined process within the Patent Office 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that invalidity must be established by facts supported 
by clear and convincing evidence). 
 273. See infra Part IV.D. 
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that does not deprive the patent holder of due process.274 Patent 
holders would not be able to appeal patent review decisions, but 
their ability to pursue subsequent litigation should be an effective 
substitute.  We expect that in most cases a patent holder who 
loses in post-grant review will see the writing on the wall and 
abandon attempts to enforce the patent; however, those patent 
holders who believe that the Patent Office has incorrectly ruled 
against their patent still have the option of proving the validity of 
their patent in litigation. In some ways, the model of post-grant 
review we propose here is more about information revelation than 
adjudication. Nonetheless, in terms of the CF-model, post-grant 
review will function as a low cost form of adjudication for a large 
number of cases, even if it is not the final forum of dispute for all 
controversies.  
The difference between the variable presumption of validity 
and the current patent system is illustrated in Table 1, below. As 
the table makes clear, the current system is indiscriminate in 
that it subjects reviewed and un-reviewed patents to the same 
strong form of the presumption of validity. The current system 
also suffers in that both post-grant review and litigation can lead 
to exactly the same outcome, thus setting up the potential for 
contradictory outcomes. Our proposal adopts an escalating 
structure that acknowledges the differences between reviewed 
and un-reviewed patents as well as between post-grant review 
and actual litigation. 
 
TABLE 1: THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY 
 
 274. Under the current reexamination system decisions of the Patent Office 
are appealable to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. See 35 U.S.C. § 
134 (2000). 
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goes against patent 
Patent Invalidated Presumption of 
Invalidity 
Patent litigation (PH 
loses on the issue of 
validity) 
Patent Invalidation Patent Invalidation 
B. MULTI-STAGE POST-GRANT REVIEW 
One of the main fears in relation to post-grant review is that 
it will be subject to the same kinds of strategic abuse that plagues 
the current patent litigation system.  Post-grant review can 
improve the patent system by allowing for more focused 
examination of patents that appear to have been improperly 
granted, but a badly structured system of post-grant review may 
also allow potential infringers to harass patent owners whose 
patents are not so suspect. To address this concern, we propose 
that post-grant review should be divided into two phases such 
that patent challengers have to essentially pre-qualify for the 
right to challenge the patent. The current patent system limits 
the opportunity to challenge a patent to those persons who (a) 
have a reasonable apprehension of being sued by the patent 
holder and (b) have several hundred thousand dollars to spend on 
federal court litigation.275 These restrictions prevent parties 
without a strong direct interest from challenging bad patents.  
For post-grant review, we propose a very different kind of 
limitation on the right to challenge the validity of a patent. 
Namely, post-grant review should be open to any person who is 
able to convince the Patent Office that there is a reasonable 
chance that one or more of the patent claims was issued in error. 
Accordingly, the first stage of post-grant review should be used as 
a screening device according to whether the challenge rises to the 
level of a “substantial new question in relation to 
patentability.”276 
                                                          
 275. AIPLA ECON. SURVEY, supra note 41, at 108. 
 276. Currently, reexamination requires a finding of a substantial new 
question of patentability based on the prior art submissions.  See Consolidated 
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1.  Stage One 
Under our proposal the first stage of post-grant review has 
three key features: (i) the requirement that the challenger 
establishes that there is a substantial new question of 
patentability in relation to the patent; (ii) it is conducted on an ex 
parte basis, without the participation of the patent holder; and 
(iii) the Patent Office’s determination on the initial phase of the 
challenge would become a matter of public record. 
i.  Substantial New Question of Patentability 
Stage One of the system of post-grant review that we propose 
would require any person wishing to challenge the validity of an 
issued patent to demonstrate to a Patent Office examiner (other 
than the person who examined the patent in the first place) that 
there is a substantial new question of patentability in relation to 
the patent. For example, a challenger could submit prior art that 
was not reviewed by the examiner and argue that the prior art 
demonstrated that the claimed invention was not, in fact, novel at 
the time the patent holder “invented” it.277 
The substantial new question of patentability test clearly 
limits the situations in which challengers can subject a patent 
owner to post-grant review. One likely objection to this 
requirement is that it will not allow for the review of invalid 
patents where the examiner did consider all the relevant 
material, but simply misunderstood the technology.  This 
limitation is necessary from the perspective of differential impact 
because post-grant review is neither intended to catch every 
mistake made by the Patent Office nor function as a total 
substitution for litigation.  Pre-qualification will reduce the 
universe of reviewable patents down to those where errors are 
most likely so that an administrative system can most efficiently 
deal with them. 
One of the main advantages of this two stage structure is 
that it allows a potential infringer to obtain the benefit of the 
Patent Office’s opinion on newly surfaced art references at a very 
low cost.  If the potential infringer is right, and there is a 
substantial new question of patentability, she is in a good position 
to reject the patent holder’s demands for a license.  If she is 
wrong, it is the patent holder who is advantaged because the 
Patent Office will publicly announce that, even in light of the 
Patent Rules, 37 C.F.R. § 1.515 (2007), MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURES § 2201 (8th ed., Rev. 2, 2004). 
 277. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
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challenger’s prior art, the patent is nonetheless valid – all at no 
cost to the patent holder. The differential impact here should be 
obvious: bad patents are more easily challenged, whereas good 
patents are actually strengthened by the first stage of the MPGR 
process. 
ii.  Stage One Proceedings Ex Parte 
An important feature of the first stage of post-grant review is 
that it takes place on an ex parte basis, without the involvement 
of, or possibly even the knowledge of, the patent holder. The 
patent holder only becomes involved in the review process if a 
patent examiner can be convinced that the challenger has raised 
an objection to the patent that merits post-grant review and that 
is appropriate to the post-grant review forum. Patent holders will 
naturally be concerned that their rights may be unfairly affected 
by the first stage of the MPGR process. However, excluding them 
from the first stage of post-grant review actually benefits them by 
reducing the possibility that post-grant review is used by 
challengers as a form of harassment.  Another benefit of the ex 
parte nature of the first stage of MPGR is that it forces potential 
infringers to disclose what may be their best evidence at an early 
stage in the proceeding, before the patent holder has incurred any 
cost in defending her patent. 
iii.  Mandatory Publication of Stage One Findings 
As previously discussed, one of the problems with relying on 
private parties to challenge invalid or over reaching patent 
assertions is that even those parties that do have the incentive to 
start such an action may well lack the incentive to finish it.278 
Individual challengers will often be better off settling with the 
patent holder for a trivial amount of money than investing more 
resources into their challenge only to have to share their victory 
with all of their competitors.279 Early settlement can be efficient 
from the point of view of the parties immediately involved, but it 
means that any future challenger must begin anew. Also, 
assuming that the terms of settlement are kept secret, other 
 278. See supra Part II.C. 
 279. See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in Patent System: A 
Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 333 (2001) (characterizing 
a patent validity challenge as a public good susceptible to a free rider problem 
where competitors are able to freely practice the invention claimed in the 
invalidated patent as a result of the challenger’s efforts). 
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potential challengers do not get the advantage of knowing how 
strong the parties thought the patent was. 
Under our proposal, a challenger is not forced to pursue the 
MPGR process to its final conclusion, but the Patent Office’s stage 
one determination on the initial challenge would become a matter 
of public record. The Patent Office’s findings with respect to the 
first stage would be published and any subsequent challenger 
would be entitled to use those findings in post-grant review or 
litigation. 
What is the significance of these published findings?  The 
patent is not invalid at this stage,280 but the first hurdle to MPGR 
has been cleared.  From this point on, it will be easier for a third 
party to pick up where the initial challenger left off, even if the 
initial challenger is appeased by the patent holder.  This reduces 
the early settlement problems discussed in Part II.  Also, the 
public recording of the Patent Office’s determination as to the 
existence of a substantial new question of patentability conveys 
significant information to the market about the likely quality of 
patent; that is, it provides a low cost method of clearly flagging at 
least some bad patents without raising the costs to good patent 
holders. 
2. Stage Two 
The second stage of MPGR consists of a review of the 
challenge by a review panel of the Patent Office. Ideally this 
review panel would consist of three experienced patent 
examiners, none of whom had made a decision with respect to the 
patent at any other time. This review would take the form of an 
adversarial proceeding in which any interested party would be 
allowed to make written submissions. 
At this stage, any party – including the original challenger, 
the patent holder, or a new challenger – may force the 
continuation of the MPGR process or join the MPGR process. In 
the case where the original challenger does not continue the 
process and no new challenger picks up the process, the patent 
holder can remove any lingering doubts as to the validity of her 
patent by continuing, on their own, with arguments to the Patent 
Office. 
C. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND POST-GRANT REVIEW 
The current patent system does not provide any mechanism 
 280. Similarly, the patent is not subject to a presumption of invalidity if our 
proposal for a variable presumption of validity is accepted. 
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for dealing with ambiguous patent claims other than federal court 
litigation. A unique feature of our proposal is that it would bring 
questions of claim construction into post-grant review such that 
both invalid and hyper-asserted patents could be addressed. 
Poor quality examination, ambiguity of language and the 
unpredictable path of technology all lead to ambiguous patent 
claims.  In consequence, established patent holders and 
entrepreneurial patent collectors have an incentive to take a 
second look at old patents relating to one technology to determine 
whether they can plausibly be asserted in relation to some new 
technology.  BT’s attempt to assert patent rights in relation to 
Internet hyperlinks exemplifies this problem.281  Similarly, the 
2004 case of Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises addressed 
whether a patent relating to “a system for electronically 
controllably viewing updateable information” on an analog 
television should also be construed to cover digital television 
technology that was not developed until well after the patent 
issued.282 
How can post-grant review address the over-assertion of 
patents that may nonetheless have a core of validity? Our 
proposal is that post-grant review should be tailored to allow 
potential infringers to negate certain claim constructions.283 For 
example, assume that a potential infringer has reason to be 
concerned about a patent whose claims could be construed to 
mean either A or B, where meaning A is fairly narrow and would 
not implicate the activities of the potential infringer but meaning 
B is much broader and would implicate the activities of the 
potential infringer. 
It would be advantageous if the potential infringer was able 
to put the issue of claim construction to the Patent Office through 
the process of post-grant review. However, the problem with 
asking the Patent Office to adjudicate claim construction is that 
any construction given by the Patent Office may prove to be just 
 281. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 282. 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Mark A. Lemley, The Changing 
Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2005). 
 283. This is analogous to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s practice 
of issuing “no-action” letters.  See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, No 
Action Letters, http://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 
2007) (“An individual or entity who is not certain whether a particular product, 
service, or action would constitute a violation of the federal securities law may 
request a ‘no-action’ letter from the SEC staff.”).  Michael Carroll has proposed a 
similar innovation with respect to the fair use doctrine in copyright law.  See 
Michael Carroll, Fixing Fair Use (working paper, on file with authors 2005). 
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as fallible as the initial claim language.  In other words, any 
definitive claim construction rendered by the Patent Office may 
simply provide a second set of words that will be ambiguous and 
subject to the unpredictable path of technology for the remainder 
of the life of the patent. There is, however, a solution to this 
problem. 
Although the Patent Office may be in no better position to 
say what the true meaning of patent claim should be after post-
grant review than it was at the time the patent issued, it should 
be able to determine what the patent does not mean.284 Under 
our proposal, potential infringers would present the Patent Office 
with a negative claim construction. For example, a developer of 
Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) technology might be 
concerned that a particular patent dealing very generally with 
packet loss might be infringed by the developer’s specific 
techniques that deal with packet loss in the context of VOIP.285 
In this example, the developer would be able to ask the 
Patent Office to confirm its understanding that the patent does 
not apply to the type of packet loss prevention used in VOIP – a 
proposition that the Patent Office may or may not agree with. In 
fact, any question of claim construction presented in this fashion 
should contain two distinct questions: (1) does the claim 
encompass the broader meaning, and (2) if so, is the claim valid? 
The reason for this second element is that there is an inherent 
link between claim scope and validity.  For many patent owners 
broad claim construction is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, 
broad claims increase the likelihood that the patent will confer 
economic power if valid, but on the other, the broader a claim 
becomes, the more likely it is to be found invalid on the basis of 
lack of novelty, obviousness, lack of enablement, or improper 
written description. 
Chiron v. Genentech286 illustrates this problem nicely. In 
Chiron the court had to decide the proper scope of the patent 
holder’s rights with respect to the isolation/creation of monoclonal 
antibodies that were capable of binding with the human antigen 
 284. Under the current law, the Patent Office is supposed to give claims “their 
broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification” both at the 
time of examination and under reexamination. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 
1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1). 
 285. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,016,513 (filed Jan. 18, 2000) (claiming “a 
method of preventing packet loss during transfer of a plurality of data packets 
between a network interface card and a host operating system of the computer 
system.”). 
 286. Chiron v. Genentech, 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed Cir. 2004). 
SAG M & ROHDE K. Patent Reform and Differential Impact. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2006;8(1):1-
93.  
84 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 8:1 
 
                                                          
 
associated with breast cancer.287  The patent holder had 
developed a number of these antigens using hybridoma 
technology developed in the early 1980’s.288 Hybridoma cells are 
used to produce monoclonal antibodies by interacting with cells 
from an animal that has been challenged with the relevant 
antigen.289 A significant problem in medical applications of this 
technique is that the end product contains murine (mouse 
derived) antibodies that are strongly rejected by the human 
immune system.290 In the late 1980’s scientists developed a way 
to overcome this problem by using recombinant DNA technology. 
Under this approach, DNA that encodes the binding portion of 
monoclonal mouse antibodies is merged with human antibodies to 
produce “chimeric” or “humanized” antibodies.291 These 
antibodies are far more useful in medical applications because of 
lower rates of rejection by the human immune system.292 
The question for the court in Chiron was whether the patent 
claims covered all creation of monoclonal antibodies that were 
capable of binding with human antigen associated with breast 
cancer, or whether they were limited to those produced through 
the plaintiff’s hybridoma technology.293  This question was 
significant because one of the patent holder’s competitors had 
developed superior monoclonal antibodies through the application 
of recombinant DNA technology.294  Illustrating the dual nature 
of broad claim construction, the court ruled that the patent claims 
applied to both methods of producing the antibodies, but also that 
the patent holder had failed to meet the enablement 
requirements with respect to that technology. Indeed, according 
to the Federal Circuit, there was no way the plaintiff’s main 
patent could have enabled chimeric antibody technology because 
that technology had not been invented at the relevant time.295 
 287. Id. at 1254-58. 
 288. Id. at 1251. 
 289. See Thomas A. Waldmann, Immunotherapy: Past, Present and Future, 9 
NATURE MED. 269 (2003), available at http://www.nature.com/cgi-
taf/DynaPage.taf?file=/nm/journal/v9/n3/full/nm0303-269.html&filetype=pdf. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1251-53. 
 294. Id. 
 295. The court held that genetically engineered antibodies, specifically 
chimeric antibodies, first appeared as a successful technology in the literature of 
this art field in May 1984. This new technology arose after the patent holder’s 
initial filing date and thus was, by definition, outside the bounds of the 
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Post-grant review should be structured to allow potential 
infringers or other interested parties to present negative claim 
constructions to the Patent Office for review because the breadth 
of claim construction is inherently tied to claim validity. As the 
Chiron case illustrates, broad claim construction is a two-edged 
sword. While an expansive reading of the patent’s claims may 
help the patent owner assert her rights more broadly, it may also 
jeopardize the validity of the patent. Broadly interpreted patent 
claims expand the universe of potentially invalidating prior art, 
and make it more difficult to meet the statutory requirements of 
written description and enablement.296 
The Patent Office could respond to a request for a negative 
claim construction in one of three ways: (1) determine that the 
claim in question does not cover the defined product, process, or 
method; (2) determine that the claim in question does cover the 
defined product process or method, but that in light of that 
construction the patent should not have been issued; (3) neither 1 
nor 2 (which carries the implication that the claim in question 
covers the defined product, process, or method). Where the Patent 
Office determines that the claim in question does not cover the 
defined product, process, or method (option 1), that negative 
construction would have to be taken into account in any 
subsequent litigation. Where the Patent Office determines that 
the claim in question does cover the defined product, process, or 
method but that in light of that construction the patent should 
not have been issued (option 2), the patent would be 
presumptively invalid with respect to that claim. Where the 
Patent Office makes neither of those determinations (option 3), 
the patent would be entitled to a strong presumption of validity 
with respect to an infringer who fell within the specifications of 
the negative construction. 
How does this relate to our proposed threshold of a 
substantial new question of patentability? Essentially, we 
enablement requirement. The Court further held the patent holder’s later 
applications in 1985 and 1986 also failed to meet the enablement requirement 
because even though the technology to genetically engineer chimeric antibodies 
existed at that point, in order to claim rights with respect to a nascent technology 
the patent would have to have provided a “specific and useful teaching.”  Id. at 
1257. 
 296. 35 USC § 112 (2000). The specification shall contain a written description 
of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such 
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to 
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the 
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying 
out her invention.  Id. 
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envisage that the Patent Office would review applications for a 
negative claim construction to determine whether they raised a 
significant or serious question. Although this is not the same as 
substantial new question of patentability, it could be employed in 
a similar filtering fashion. The Patent Office should be given a 
broad discretion to decide whether to consider applications for 
negative claim constructions; it should also be allowed to develop 
an appropriate filtering standard under its rule making 
authority.297 
D. DISPUTED FEATURES OF POST-GRANT REVIEW 
The procedural details of post-grant review are of critical 
importance because post-grant review only makes sense if it 
presents a viable low cost alternative to litigation.  Accordingly, 
commentary typically focuses on the attractiveness of post-grant 
review to potential challengers.298  However, the question of 
differential cost is just as significant as cost in general.  As we 
have argued at length in this article, an important criterion 
should be whether any proposed element of post-grant review 
imposes higher costs on bad patents than it does on good patents. 
This leads us to make the following recommendations with 
respect to other disputed features of post-grant review. 
1. Issues of Format, Scope and Discovery 
The fundamental design constraint for post-grant review is 
cost. If post-grant review is going to work as a genuine 
alternative to litigation, it must be significantly more affordable 
than patent litigation. Controlling the legal costs of post-grant 
review requires eliminating the two greatest expenses of 
litigation: discovery and oral argument.  In contrast to the 
proposals for limited discovery in the House and Senate Bills299 
and the recommendations of the NAS and the FTC,300 we believe 
that so long as the scope of reviewable issues is kept narrow, 
discovery will be unnecessary. 
 297. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2000) (powers and duties of the United States Patent 
& Trademark Office). 
 298. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 22, at 101 (describing how many “bad” patents 
are never revoked or even challenged in court). 
 299. Patent Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 9 (draft amendment to H.R. 
2795 recommended discovery for depositions of persons submitting affidavits or 
declarations as well as any additional discovery that is “required in the interest 
of justice”). 
 300. See NAS REPORT, supra note 24, at 96; FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 11. 
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This, in turn, requires that the scope of issues under review 
in post-grant review be limited so that the exclusion of discovery 
and oral argument does not lead to injustice. Consistent with the 
House Bill and the Senate Bill, we believe the scope of post-grant 
review should be limited to issues relating to patentability.  This 
ensures that the Patent Office can review the patent without any 
inquiry into the inventor’s state of mind or personal knowledge at 
the time of the application. The practical effect of this 
recommendation is that post-grant review would extend to 
novelty, obviousness, and enablement, but would not include 
issues such as statutory bars, best mode or inequitable conduct.  
Given these limitations, both discovery and oral arguments 
should not be necessary for the parties to make effective 
arguments concerning patentability. 
2. Window of Opportunity 
If post-grant review is going to provide a real alternative to 
litigation, it must be available to potential infringers at any point 
in time after the patent has issued. The NAS, the FTC, and the 
current House Bill all recommend a limited time period during 
which post-grant review may be utilized, varying from nine 
months to a year.301  The NAS further proposes a trigger allowing 
post-grant review whenever the patent holder alleges 
infringement by lawsuit or notice of intent to file suit.302 
In contrast, we believe that post-grant review must be 
available for the life of the patent.  Critics suggest that the 
opposition period be limited for a variety of reasons: a limited 
period reduces the misuse of post-grant review proceedings by 
challengers who wish to delay or injure the patent holder;303  
property law favors a settled title because this allows value 
expectations to settle, thereby engendering commercial stability 
and fostering the market for patent licensing;304 and efficiency 
results from reducing uncertainty over patent validity.305  While 
these are real concerns, we see more immediate and definable 
negative effects that result from a limited time period for post-
 301. See NAS REPORT, supra note 24, at 115 (one year window plus a trigger); 
FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 234-235, n.168 (citing the PTO’s one year 
recommendation and recommending a fixed period for post-grant review 
availability); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 9 (2005). 
 302. See NAS REPORT, supra note 24, at 115. 
 303. Farrell & Merges, supra note 22, at 968. 
 304. Id. at n.74 (quoting Steven G. Kunin & Anton W. Fetting, The 
Metamorphosis of Inter Partes Reexamination, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971 
(2004). 
 305. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 22, at 91. 
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grant review. 
First, a limited time period for post-grant review creates a 
burden on firms to actively and closely monitor every Patent 
Office proceeding for subject matter which relates to their current 
or future products. Interested third parties who fail to monitor 
Patent Office proceedings would reside in an information void.  
They would be precluded in many instances from availing 
themselves of the low cost post-grant review alternative to 
litigation.  This monitoring is an across-the-board increase in 
costs. 
Second, if bad patent holders know that competitors do not 
closely monitor Patent Office proceedings, bad patent holders 
have an incentive to wait until the close of the opposition period 
before asserting their patents.  Similarly, holders of good patents 
who are nonetheless uncertain of their patent’s strength have an 
incentive to wait until the limited opposition period closes before 
asserting their rights.  If no limited opposition period existed, it 
would make no difference when holders of good patents asserted 
their rights, as they could assert their rights whenever it became 
strategically optimal for them to do so. 
Third, it is relatively uncommon for patents to be litigated 
within the first nine months after issuance.306 According to John 
Allison et al., patent litigation, on average, reaches a peak during 
the third year following issuance and continues at a significant 
pace through at least the fifteenth year following issuance.307 
3. Estoppel 
It is widely agreed that the current inter-partes 
reexamination system has been underutilized because 
challengers who fail to persuade the Patent Office in 
reexamination are estopped from raising the same arguments in 
subsequent litigation.308 The House Bill repeats this short-coming 
with respect to post-grant review.  Specifically, the House Bill 
bars a challenger from raising “any issue of fact or law actually 
decided and necessary to the determination” of an opposition 
proceeding once a final determination of that opposition has been 
made.309 The House Bill provides an exception for a challenger 
 306. Allison, supra note 76, at app. Fig. 1. 
 307. Id. 
 308. See supra notes 257–259 and accompanying text. 
 309. Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. § 2 
(2006). 
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who demonstrates that there is additional material factual 
evidence that could not reasonably have been discovered or 
presented in the opposition proceeding.310 
The Senate Bill takes a slightly different approach. This Bill 
proposes a limited form of estoppel for challenges initiated within 
a year of the issuance of the patent and a broader form of estoppel 
for any challenge initiated thereafter.311 Under the limited 
estoppel approach, a challenger would only be estopped from 
raising an issue of fact or law that it did in fact raise in 
opposition.  In contrast, under the broader form of estoppel 
potential infringers wishing to avail themselves of post-grant 
opposition would be barred from subsequently raising any 
grounds they raised or could have raised in the opposition 
proceeding.312 
We disagree with both the House and the Senate Bills in this 
respect because post-grant review can only be effective if 
potential infringers are willing to use it. Accordingly, we propose 
entirely removing estoppel from post-grant review. The argument 
against removing estoppel is that it serves to prevent repetitive or 
harassing proceedings and litigation.  There are two problems 
with this reasoning.  First, it assumes that repetitive or harassing 
litigation is a more significant problem than an under-utilized 
system of post-grant review.  Second, there are better ways of 
protecting the legitimate interests of patent holders and 
preventing the inappropriate use of post-grant review. For 
example, as we have already proposed, post-grant review could be 
divided into two phases, so that patent challengers have to 
essentially pre-qualify for the right to challenge the patent. 
4. Amendment of Claims during Post-Grant Review 
We propose that amendments be allowed during post-grant 
review, but that they nonetheless be subjected to the same 
adversarial proceedings as all other patentability considerations 
during post-grant review.  In some respects, this differs from 
other recommendations. The NAS report is silent on this 
matter.313  The FTC recommends allowing amendments, but does 
not address the issue of whether they may be argued against by 
the challenger.314 It would seem imprudent not to allow the 
 310. Id. 
 311. Patent Reform Act of 2005, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 9 (2006). 
 312. Id. 
 313. See NAS REPORT, supra note 24. 
 314. See FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 16, 193–96. 
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expertise and information forwarding capabilities of the 
challenger to be heard.  Though the challenger may be motivated 
by different concerns than the Patent Office, the Patent Office 
would still be the ultimate arbiter of patentability issues and 
should be able to separate rhetoric from truly relevant prior art 
and argument.  The undesirable alternative is to allow 
uncontested amendments, which could eventually be subjected to 
another round of post-grant review challenges based on new 
submissions by the current challenger.  This is an inefficient use 
of resources and the probability of later challenges should be 
eliminated through the use of a more timely challenge during the 
amendment process. 
E. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT FOR POST-GRANT 
REVIEW 
The differential impact criteria we have established in this 
article suggest the implementation of a very different kind of 
post-grant review system from those that are currently on the 
table. The first point of departure is the variable presumption of 
validity. The main advantage of applying a variable presumption 
of validity is that it differentiates based on patent characteristics 
that are tied to validity in a probabilistic sense. Patents that are 
issued and never challenged have probably only been scrutinized 
for between 18 and 41.5 hours,315 whereas a patent that has been 
subject to post-grant review will have been subjected to hundreds 
of hours of intensive examination.  Thus, a patent which is upheld 
after post-grant review seems much more likely to be valid than 
one which has not. Another advantage of the variable 
presumption of validity is that it facilitates a streamlined post-
grant review system that does not overlap with judicial 
proceedings by applying a presumption of invalidity to patents 
that are successfully challenged in post-grant review. Our 
proposal is that post-grant review should not be the subject of any 
appeal.  Rather, a patent holder who believes that the Patent 
Office was in error should simply attempt to enforce her rights in 
court. If she is successful, the Patent Office’s post-grant review 
determination is effectively overruled, if not, the ruling stands. 
This streamlined system will keep the cost of post-grant review 
affordable and will also make it clear that post-grant review is 
not simply an alternative forum for litigation. 
 315. See supra note 62. 
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The second point of departure between the system of post-
grant review we envisage and the current raft of legislative 
proposals is that we believe that post-grant review should be 
comprised of two distinct stages. Under our proposed multi-stage 
post-grant review, challengers would have to effectively earn the 
right to challenge a patent by convincing the Patent Office that 
they were able to demonstrate some substantial new question of 
patentability that had not yet been considered at the time the 
patent was initially examined. MPGR may be more efficient than 
a single stage process because it allows potential infringers to 
resolve one of the major uncertainties of patent litigation very 
early in the process. It is often the case that a potential infringer 
will form the opinion that a particular piece of prior art is fatal to 
the validity of the patent, but to test that opinion currently 
requires commitment to substantial litigation costs.  This filtering 
device will narrow down those cases eligible for post-grant review 
to those instances where there is clearly a significant question to 
be addressed. While this may allow a number of invalid patents to 
escape post-grant review, it will also protect the majority of good 
patents from unmeritorious post-grant review proceedings. Multi-
stage post-grant review is essential to ensuring that post-grant 
review has more impact on bad patents than on good ones by 
balancing the need for low cost challenge with the need to protect 
patent holders from undue harassment. 
Our third point of departure with the current post-grant 
review proposals relates to claim construction. Currently the only 
way a potential infringer can obtain any certainty with respect to 
ambiguous patent claims is via federal court litigation. However, 
this is only an option to persons who have a reasonable 
apprehension of being sued for infringement by the patent holder.  
This seems overly restrictive because it does not provide any 
means whereby a person can test the meaning of a patent claim 
without investing in activity that is potentially infringing. Our 
proposal is that potential infringers should be able to negate 
certain claim constructions through post-grant review. 
CONCLUSION 
Congressional efforts to address the crisis of confidence in the 
United States patent system have failed up to the present day. If 
Congress is to have any hope of passing much needed legislative 
reform to the Patent Act, the supporters of patent reform will 
have to unite behind a streamlined set of proposals that directly 
address the most pressing and unambiguous defects of the 
current patent system. To that end, we have proposed applying a 
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test of differential impact to enable Congress to prioritize those 
reforms which will discourage the acquisition and assertion of bad 
patents without unduly prejudicing the interests of the holders of 
good patents. The differential impact approach elucidated in this 
article has three distinct advantages over other, proffered efforts 
to rewrite the patent system from the ground up. First, the 
differential impact approach provides a mechanism by which to 
evaluate competing claims for legislative resources. Second, the 
differential impact approach is an appropriate response to the 
empirical uncertainty surrounding optimal patent scope. Third, 
differential impact is consistent with the need to take the 
legitimate expectations of current stakeholders into account. 
The economic models developed in this article suggest that 
individuals and businesses accused of patent infringement often 
have weak incentives to challenge bad patents, even when they 
are fairly sure those patents are invalid. Additionally, these 
economic models demonstrate that patent holders have strong 
incentives to demand royalties which are not in fact supported by 
the patents they hold. These demands may be unsupported either 
because the patent is invalid, or because it is much narrower in 
scope than the patent holder represents. The AF-model indicates 
that where targeting costs are low and the prospect of retaliation 
is small, a rational patent holder will broadly assert her patent 
even where the probability that any individual target will accept 
a license is low.  The AF-model is particularly useful in 
determining which proposed reforms are likely to have a 
differential impact on bad patents because it indicates that 
exposing patent holders to retaliation when they assert their 
patents has the potential to create a differential cost between 
good patent holders and bad patent holders. 
In Part III of this article we have reviewed a wide range of 
reform proposals relating to patent examination, substantive 
patent doctrine, the structure and procedures of patent litigation. 
Of all the reforms surveyed, the one that appears to have the best 
potential for differential impact is post-grant review. 
The importance of post-grant review is highlighted by the 
economic models developed in this article. First, the CF-model 
indicates that the high cost of federal court litigation shields bad 
patents from scrutiny in many cases.  Post-grant review will 
address this by providing a low cost method of challenging 
patents. Second, the AF-model indicates that it would be more 
costly to assert bad patents if the expected cost of retaliation for 
asserting a bad patent was significantly higher than the expected 
SAG M & ROHDE K. Patent Reform and Differential Impact. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2006;8(1):1-
93.  
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cost of retaliation for asserting a good patent. Currently, both 
good and bad patents are placed at considerable risk in federal 
court litigation.316 However, in post-grant review, only bad 
patents have a significant probability of being invalidated. 
Consequently, the AF-model indicates that introducing a system 
of post-grant review would discourage the assertion of bad 
patents without discouraging the assertion of good patents. Third, 
both the CF-model and the AF-model indicate that uncertainty 
and information asymmetries relating to patent quality are 
detrimental to good patents and advantageous to bad patents. 
Under a system of post-grant review, potential infringers will be 
able to resolve key questions relating to patent validity more 
quickly and more cheaply than in federal court litigation. As a 
result, post-grant review will also have a differential impact on 
bad patents by reducing uncertainty and information 
asymmetries relating to patent quality. 
In order to further demonstrate the utility of our differential 
impact approach, we have applied the standard to sketch an 
outline of how post-grant review should be implemented. 
Interestingly, looking at post-grant review through the lens of 
differential impact leads us to propose a very different kind of 
system to that currently embodied in the House Bill, the Senate 
Bill or those proposed by the FTC, the NAS and various other 
commentators.317 
Adopting the differential impact standard elaborated in this 
article will enable Congress to evaluate and prioritize competing 
patent reform proposals. As such, the differential impact test 
provides a way out of the legislative quagmire that seems to have 
engulfed the patent reform movement. 
 316. This is not to suggest the risk is the same regardless of the underlying 
validity of the patent. 
 317. The differences between our MPGR proposal and other versions of post-
grant review are summarized at the beginning of this article. See supra Part IV. 
